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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
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professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
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Upcoming Courses
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Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
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 ??????	 ???????
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
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This 9th Bi-Annual OsgoodePD 
one day  intensive program on the 
law  of Search and Seizure in 
Canada will give you the latest and most important 
developments. You will get practical tactics and information 
you can use from prominent experts.
http://osgoodepd.ca/upcoming_programs/9th-bi-annual-symposium-on-search-and-seizure-law-in-canada/
see 
page  
39-40
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Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
REGISTER NOW
AGENDA
PROGRAM FACULTY
WHO SHOULD
ATTEND
PRICE
 CREDITS
REQUEST
BROCHURE
DOWNLOAD
BROCHURE PDF
SPONSOR THIS
PROGRAM
HOTEL & PARKING
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The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Caffeinated learning: how to design and conduct 
rich, robust professional training.
Anne M. Beninghof.
San Bernadino, CA: Ideas for Educators, 2014.
HF  5549.5 T7 B46 2014
Conflict resolution [videorecording]:  the skill  that 
makes the difference.
Produced by Edge Training  Systems; executive 
producer, Paul O'Keefe; directed and written by Tim 
Armstrong.
Port Perry, ON: Owen-Stewart Performance 
Resources [distributor], 2005.
1 videodisc (17 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 CD-ROM 
Helps participants become better managers of 
conflict so that they can build productive 
relationships in the workplace. Explains strategies for
conflict resolution. Participants have an opportunity 
to learn and practice their conflict resolution skills in 
a variety of different ways.
HD 42 C66 2005 D2046
Consensus-oriented decision-making: the CODM 
model for facilitating  groups to widespread 
agreement.
Tim Hartnett.
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2011.
HM 746 H37 2011
Cool down: getting further by going slower.
Steve Prentice.
Mississauga, ON: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2007.
HD 69 T54 P723 2007
 
Developing teams:  the leader's role:  20 tried and 
tested  activities for promoting  and maintaining 
team learning.
Caroline Love and Aileen Goodman.
Port Perry, ON: Owen-Stewart Performance 
Resources Inc., 2008.
Provides activities that are designed to develop  team 
leaders who confidently lead team learning  and 
development; and who are equipped with all the 
skills and knowledge they need to develop  team 
building and whole team learning.
HD 66 L684 2008
I hear you: repair communication breakdowns, 
negotiate successfully, and build consensus ... in 
three simple steps.
Donny Ebenstein.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
2013.
HD 30.3 E24 2013
The infographic resume: how to create a visual 
portfolio that showcases your skills and lands the 
job.
Hannah Morgan.
New York, NY: McGraw Hill Education, 2014.
HF 5383 M674 2014
Introduction to the Canadian legal system.
Sasha Baglay.
Toronto, ON: Pearson, 2015.
KE 444 B27 2015
Leadership feedback [videorecording]:  what 
employees want to tell you ... but don't.
Written & directed by Jack Donaldson; produced by 
Barbara Polansky.
Port Perry, ON: Owen-Stewart Performance 
Resources [distributor], 2014.
1 vidoedisc (17 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 CD-ROM 
CD-ROM contains leader's guide (PDF), participant 
worksheets (PDF) and PowerPoint file (PPT). Provides 
an honest look at what employees really think about 
their leaders and how that affects their work.  The 
program illustrates 2 leaders: one ineffective and the 
other effective in 6  key areas of leader/employee  
interaction.
HF 5549.5 C6 L43 2014 D2048
Volume 15 Issue 4 - July/August 2015
PAGE 4
???????	 ?????	 ??????	 ??	 
???????	 ?????????	 ??	 ????	 
??????????
R. v. Ali, 2015 BCCA 333
The British Columbia Court of Appeal has held that 
an accused, when charged with breaching  his 
recognizance of bail, was required to establish that 
his actions fell within an exception to his house 
arrest condition. “Common law principles establish 
that a person charged with an offence under s. 145
(3)  of the Criminal Code must prove an exception or 
an excuse on a balance of probabilities,” said Justice 
Stromberg-Stein for the Court of Appeal. In other 
words, the Crown does not bear the onus of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the inapplicability of an 
exception to an accused’s bail condition. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
???	 ????????	 ????	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R. v. Chaing, 2014 ONCA 870
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
after police found 26  lbs. of the  drug  in the trunk of 
a car driven by the accused. The issue  on appeal was 
whether the Crown had proven beyond a  reasonable 
doubt that the accused was aware  of the marihuana 
in the trunk. In the accused’s view, the trial judge 
had erroneously concluded that he  had the required 
knowledge of the marihuana in the trunk. 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. The trial judge 
did not conclude the accused was guilty of 
possessing  the marihuana in the trunk simply 
because  he knew there was a small amount of 
marihuana in the car’s console. Rather, the judge 
used the marihuana in plain view between the driver 
and passenger seats as part of the circumstantial 
evidence that the accused had knowledge of what 
was in the trunk; it was not determinative by  itself. 
As well, the judge considered all of the evidence 
including  the accused’s behaviour before and after 
the stop  in supporting  the inference he knew about 
the marihuana in the trunk. Rather than taking  a 
compartmentalized and isolated analysis of each 
strand of circumstantial evidence, the question of 
whether the criminal standard of proof had been met 
required an analysis of the cumulative effect of all of 
the evidence (each part of the evidence considered 
together). 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
??	 ???????????	 ??	 
??????????	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R. v. Degraw, 2015 ONCA 515
The Ontario Court of Appeal found a trial judge 
erred in telling  a jury that “[a]n operator of a motor 
vehicle is presumed to be in possession and control 
of items in his car.” In this case, the accused had 
been charged with occupying  a motor vehicle  with a 
firearm in it and possessing  a loaded prohibited 
firearm. “There is no presumption of possession by a 
driver of items in his car,” said the Appeal Court. 
Nevertheless, the convictions were upheld. The 
shotgun was in plain view near the accused and his 
passenger had left the car with the shotgun, 
brandished it during  an assault and returned to the 
car with it. This was sufficient to affix  the accused 
with knowledge of its presence.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BY THE BOOK:
??????	 ??	 ????????????? Criminal Code
s. 145(3) Every person who is at large on an 
undertaking or recognizance given to or entered 
into before a justice or judge and is bound to 
comply with a condition of that undertaking or 
recognizance, and every person who is bound 
to comply with a direction under subsection 515(12) or 522
(2.1) or an order under subsection 516(2), and who fails, 
without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on them, to 
comply with the condition, direction or order is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
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R. v. Sanghera, 2015 BCCA 316 
The police initiated a project (code 
named Rebellion) to prevent drive‑by 
shoot ings among  r ival groups 
including  the Sanghera and Adiwal 
groups. The accused was a member of 
the Sanghera group. Acting  on information that there 
were a number of rifles and handguns stored in a 
detached garage owned by the  accused’s mother, the 
police obtained a search warrant. No guns were 
located but multiple boxes of 9 mm and 40 caliber 
ammunition, a magazine for a 9 mm pistol and two 
sawed off butts from long  guns were found. The lead 
investigator was present and it appeared to him that 
the at large sawed off long  guns represented a 
significant danger to the public. Over the next few 
weeks there were several incidents that concerned 
the investigator. These included:
• An altercation between the accused and a 
member of the Adiwal group at a casino. 
• Informer information that the accused’s house had 
been shot at by a person driving  by which was not 
reported to the police. 
• Two shootings at homes belonging to Adiwal 
associates. 
• Vehicles were seen by police circling  around the 
Saghera residence in a suspicious fashion. Two 
vehicles were stopped and found to be driven by 
Adiwal group associates. 
• The accused’s cousin’s girlfriend reported that two 
vehicles had attempted to box her in while she 
was driving a vehicle that both she and her 
boyfriend (the cousin) regularly drove. Source 
information revealed the cousin was upset about 
the incident and would retaliate. 
• Informer information was received that the 
Sangheras were angry and wanted to “get” an 
Adiwal group member.  
• Vehicles driven by an Adiwal group member and 
a member of the Sanghera group had a close 
encounter in a hotel parking lot.  The lead 
investigator thought the presence of a marked 
police car in the area may have prevented an 
altercation.
During  this time the police erected traffic  barriers 
near some of the residences to make drive‑by 
shootings more difficult.
The lead investigator then received informer 
information that the Sangheras were wearing 
ballistic vests and were armed. They were reportedly 
in “hunt mode”.   Although little  was known about 
the source of the information, the investigator was 
later given the licence number of the vehicle  being 
driven by the accused and determined it was a rental 
vehicle. Rental vehicles, in the investigator’s 
experience, were  often used to commit crimes. The 
police observed the vehicle being  driven in a 
suspicious fashion. It was moving  in a slow and 
methodical manner in a very specific area. It 
appeared to be “snaking” and apparently looking  for 
a specific target. 
Based on these observations and the background 
over time, the lead investigator believed that the 
Sangheras were in “crime mode” and were “going  to 
potentially be conducting  a shooting”. The 
investigator decided the vehicle should be tactically 
taken down by ERT because there was a  high chance 
of gun violence. The vehicle was slow to pull over 
and some of the occupants were seen to be moving 
in a manner consistent with them reaching  around 
as if trying  to hide  something. ERT members 
approached with their guns drawn. The accused was 
wearing  body armour and a fully loaded pistol 
magazine  was seen on the front passenger seat. The 
occupants of the vehicle were placed in individual 
locked compartments in a police wagon. A police 
dog  was used to sniff the vehicle. The dog  indicated 
an interest in the glove box where two loaded 
handguns were found.  The accused was then 
advised that he was under arrest and informed of his 
right to counsel.  The vehicle was impounded and 
again searched which resulted in another handgun 
being found.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found that all four occupants 
of the car had been placed under de 
facto arrest when they were stopped by 
police. These arrests were lawful under s. 
495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code because the lead 
Volume 15 Issue 4 - July/August 2015
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investigator had “abundant reasonable grounds” to 
believe the occupants were  “about to commit an 
indictable offence” (a shooting). Not only did the 
lead investigator have the necessary subjective 
belief, his belief was objectively reasonable. Thus, 
the occupants were not arbitrarily  detained and 
there  was no s. 9 Charter violation. The searches of 
the car were lawful as an incident to arrest and did 
not breach s. 8. “Searches for the  overlapping 
purposes of obtaining  evidence and ensuring  officer 
and public safety were, indeed, truly incidental to 
the purpose of the arrests [the lead investigator] 
directed,” said the judge. “The searches of the 
vehicle at the scene of the stop were lawfully 
incidental to arrest.” The accused was convicted on 
three  counts of possessing  a loaded prohibited or 
restricted firearm and one count of being  in a 
vehicle knowing  that there was a firearm in it. He 
was sentenced to seven years in prison.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended that his 
warrantless arrest was not lawful 
because  there  were not reasonable 
grounds for it. In his view, the lead 
investigator did not objectively have reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest him. He argued that there 
were many shortcomings in the factors relied upon 
for the investigator’s grounds. As a result, he 
submitted he was arbitrarily detained under s. 9 and 
the evidence obtained as a result of the searches 
incidental to his arrest should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2).
Justice Chiasson, speaking  for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal, concluded that the accused was 
attempting  to individually parse the  ingredients of 
the lead investigator’s belief. This was not the correct 
approach. Instead, no one factor by itself led to the 
decision for the arrest:
Looking at the constellation of factors available 
to the lead investigator, I have no difficulty 
whatsoever concluding that his belief that the 
[accused] and his companions were in “crime 
mode” was reasonable objectively. Had he failed 
to act and violence ensued, he may very well 
have been open to criticism.
All of the indicia available to the lead 
investigator suggested that the [accused] and his 
cohorts were set to do violence.  The violence 
may have been contained between the two 
groups or it may have overlapped to affect 
innocent members of the public.  The objective 
of Project Rebellion was to prevent such 
conduct. The facts showed an escalating risk of 
violence. The lead investigator acted reasonably 
and responsibly to avoid the realization of that 
risk. [paras. 53-54]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Ali, 2015 MBCA 64
A 49-year-old first time offender has had his 
sentence of nine months imprisonment and a three-
year driving  ban upheld by the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal. He had been convicted on two counts of 
dangerous driving  causing  bodily  harm after he 
entered a busy  downtown intersection against a red 
light while  holding  and talking  on his mobile phone. 
He collided with another vehicle and careened 
sideways into two pedestrians. He also knocked 
down a traffic light pole  and ended upside down on 
the sidewalk. The pedestrians were knocked 
unconscious and sustained significant injury. The 
panel of three appellate judges concluded that the 
sentence was not demonstrably unfit:
Synchronously operating  a motor vehicle and a 
hand-operated electronic device is dangerous 
and highly blameworthy conduct that can result 
in significant criminal consequences for 
otherwise law-abiding motorists.  Simply put, 
mobile phones and other like gadgets do not 
belong in a driver’s hand. The public interest 
requires motorists to resist the temptation to talk, 
text or otherwise become distracted to ensure 
that our streets do not resemble battlefields.  
Cases of dangerous driving, like this one, which 
result in significant injuries to a third party and 
are caused by a motorist being  purposefully 
distracted because of use of a hand-operated 
electronic device, require that the primary 
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sentencing considerations be denunciation and 
general deterrence even for sympathetic first-
time offenders, with good driving records, who, 
like the [accused], are considered by probation 
services to be remorseful and a “very low risk to 
re-offend.”
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
????????????	 ???????????	 
????	 ???	 ?????	 ?	 
??????????	 ?????
R. v. Laveck, 2015 ABCA 61
Police followed a stolen truck for several minutes. A 
man drove it and had a female passenger. Police lost 
the vehicle for two minutes but found it abandoned 
in an alley. There were no keys in the ignition and its 
steering  column was broken so it could be started 
without a  key. Walking  nearby the alley’s mouth 
were the accused and a woman. They resembled the 
two seen in the  truck and were about a 20 second 
walk away from it. Police saw no-one else. A cyclist 
in the area saw two people leave the truck. He then 
rode around the block after seeing  police converge 
in the area, but also saw no-one else around. The 
accused was subsequently convicted of possessing 
stolen property and dangerous driving. 
On appeal, the accused argued that the police had 
not checked for suspects in all possible places 
around the area. It could have been possible, he 
suggested, that the police  arrested the wrong  couple. 
In the minute or two that the police lost the stolen 
vehicle, he contended that the offending  couple 
disappeared from the scene and another innocent 
couple (he and the woman)  appeared at the right 
time and place. The Alberta Court of Appeal rejected 
this possibility:
[W]e view this as a case of interlocking 
circumstantial evidence. … The question for a 
trial judge is not whether any one piece of 
evidence could leave a reasonable doubt. The 
question is whether the cumulative effect of all 
that evidence leaves a reasonable doubt. [para. 
6]
And further:
It is metaphysically possible that in the relevant 
100 feet or so, and during the relevant 20 
seconds or so, one couple disappeared, and a 
similar-looking couple appeared. But the chance 
of that is so extremely remote that it does not 
constitute a reasonable doubt. [para. 14]
As for knowledge that the truck was stolen, the Court 
of Appeal concluded that this had been proven:
Knowledge of the driver that the truck was stolen 
is easily inferred from the evident damage to the 
steering column and the starting system, the lack 
of keys, evading the police, and the tools 
possessed. [para. 16]
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
??????	 ?????????	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R. v. Chang, 2015 BCCA 62
The British Columbia Court of Appeal has confirmed 
a trial judge’s conclusion that the  accused’s state of 
knowledge about the stolen nature  of a motorcycle 
he claimed he had purchased from a third party 
owner had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
through the doctrine  of willful blindness, even if his 
“fairy-tale-like story” was believable: 
Wilful blindness arises where a person who has 
become aware of the need for some inquiry declines 
to make the inquiry because he does not  wish to 
know the truth. He would  prefer to remain ignorant. 
[para. 25, reference omitted]
The accused said he had handed over all the money 
he had, plus some he had borrowed, without even 
test driving  or starting  the  motorcycle. He said he 
met the seller at a gas station and later that day paid 
cash for the motorcycle  at an apartment parking  lot. 
He did not try to confirm that the vendor was the 
person entitled to sell the motorcycle and, while 
parked at the apartment, it had licence  plates 
attached to it that were not registered to it or any 
other vehicle. Although the judge noted that there 
were individual pieces of evidence from which 
innocent inferences could be drawn, the  evidence as 
a whole was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
accused had “failed to inquire about whether the 
vendor of the motorcycle had stolen it because he 
did not want to know the truth.”
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Awad, 2015 NSCA 10
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has reinstated a 
provincial court judge’s ruling  that informations 
against eight accused persons were a nullity because 
the officer who swore them did so falsely. The officer 
testified she swore before a  JP that she had 
reasonable grounds to believe that individuals 
named in hundreds of informations had committed 
crimes. However, she actually  had no knowledge 
whatsoever about the  charges and therefore  no 
reasonable grounds to believe that any criminal 
offence had been committed. Instead, she merely 
relied on her belief that whoever investigated the 
cases had the necessary reasonable grounds or that 
her superiors did. 
After learning  of this defect, eight individuals 
brought a motion before a Nova Scotia Provincial 
Court judge to quash the informations against them 
as being  nullities. The judge found the officer swore 
a false  information and in doing  so misled the JP. He 
quashed the informations and did not allow them to 
be re-sworn so the current proceedings could 
continue. The Court of Appeal agreed:
[I]t is just as much a failure to comply with the 
mandates of the Code for the informant to falsely 
swear before the proper judicial officer that she 
has reasonable grounds to believe a named 
individual has committed certain offences, as it 
is to have such a belief, but purport to swear to 
those matters before someone who is not a 
properly designated judicial officer. [para. 30]
And further:
An information based on a false oath is just as 
much a nullity as if an informant swore an 
information before someone who is not a justice 
of the peace, or a crucial date is left out, or 
where the name of the informant is left blank. 
[para. 33, reference omitted]
The Crown could, however, institute new 
proceedings by having  the informations re-sworn by 
an officer having the requisite grounds to do so. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Bornyk, 2015 BCCA 28
The British Columbia  Court of 
Appeal has set aside the 
acquittal of an accused on a 
break and enter charge after a 
judge did his own literature 
review. A police officer who 
was qualified as an expert in 
the identification, comparison and individualization 
of fingerprints identified a fingerprint found within 
the home of the break and enter as belonging  to the 
accused. The judge  then took  it upon himself to read 
several articles that were critical of fingerprint 
analysis. These articles were not marked as exhibits, 
tested in evidence nor put to the fingerprint expert. 
But portions of the articles were replicated in the 
judge’s reasons for acquittal. The  judge also 
compared the latent print lifted from the home with 
the known print and found discrepancies. 
The Crown appealed the acquittal arguing  that the 
trial judge erred by relying  on his own research and 
by engaging  in his own unguided comparison of the 
latent print to the known print. The Court of Appeal 
found the trial judge did err. First, the judge  could 
only  rely on the  evidence presented at trial unless 
judicial notice could be taken. “Judicial notice, of 
course, is limited to facts that are notorious or 
generally beyond debate, as in the assertion the 
earth is not flat, or are  capable of immediate and 
accurate demonstration from readily accessible 
sources of indisputable accuracy, as in the assertion 
that New Year’s Day in 2015 fell on a  Thursday,” said 
Justice Saunders, speaking  for the unanimous Appeal 
Court. Here, the articles reviewed by the judge were 
commenting  on forensic science and involved 
discussions on fingerprint analysis, including 
opinion. These were not matters for which the judge 
could take judicial notice and therefore he  erred in 
embarking  on his self-directed, independent 
research and considering  the fruits of his 
investigation in his decision. In doing  so, he 
compromised the appearance  of judic ia l 
independence and assumed the role of advocate, 
witness and judge. Second, his own analysis of the 
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fingerprints, absent the assistance of an expert, was 
problematic:
The very point of having  an expert witness in a 
technical area, here fingerprint analysis, is that 
the specialized field requires elucidation in 
order for the court to form a correct judgment. 
While it may be desirable that a judge 
personally observe the similarities and 
differences between the latent point and known 
point, such examination should be guided by a 
witness so as to avoid the trier of fact forming a 
view contrary to an explanation that may be 
available if only the chance were provided to 
proffer it.
The judge relied upon his own observation of 
what he said was a difference between the latent 
and known prints. The fingerprint witness 
however was never questioned on that area of 
the fingerprint. Whether this “difference” is 
forensically significant is speculation. This 
unassisted comparison had a material bearing  on 
the verdict. [paras. 18-19, references omitted]
A new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Gibbons, 2015 ONCA 47
The Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld the 
constitutionality of s. 127 of the Criminal Code. This 
provision makes it a hybrid offence to, without 
lawful excuse, disobey a lawful order made by a 
court of justice or by a person or body of persons 
authorized by any Act to make or give the order 
(other than the payment of money) unless a 
punishment or other mode of proceeding  is 
expressly provided by law. “Act” is defined in s. 2 of 
the Criminal Code to include “an Act of the 
legislature of a province.” 
In this case, the accused breached an interlocutory 
injunction issued by an Ontario Court judge that 
prohibited anti-abortion protests within 60 feet of 
certain abortion clinics. She had leaflets and was 
carrying  a 2-foot by 3-foot sign that said: “Why 
mom? When I have so much love to give.” She stood 
on the sidewalk in front of a clinic and was warned 
by a sheriff to move outside  the 60-foot buffer zone 
created by the injunction.  Despite multiple 
warnings, she refused to move. The police were 
called and they too asked the accused to move. She 
again refused and was arrested and charged under s. 
127. 
At her trial, the accused argued that s. 127 was ultra 
vires (beyond the powers)  Parliament because the 
section delegated part of the federal criminal law 
power to provincial legislatures. In its ruling, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal cited the Supreme Court of 
Canada in United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta 
(Attorney General), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, which 
stated:
The distinction between creating  the criminal 
law and engaging  i t i s i l lus t ra ted by 
consideration of s. 127 of the [Criminal] Code, 
which makes it an offence to disobey a lawful 
order made by a court of justice “or by a person 
or body of persons authorized by any Act to 
make or give the order”. “Act” is defined (in s. 2 
of the Code) to include “an Act of the legislature 
of a province”. This means it is always a criminal 
offence to breach an order of a provincial 
tribunal, even if that tribunal is not authorized 
by provincial law to file the order as an order of 
the court. It is clear that the province is not 
enacting  criminal law every time it empowers a 
tribunal to make orders which may not be filed 
with the court, even though it is a criminal 
offence to breach such an order; rather, the 
province has enacted non-criminal law, which is 
within its sphere of competence, and Parliament, 
acting within its sphere, has decided to make it a 
criminal offence to breach this provincial law. 
Similarly, the province is not enacting a new 
criminal law each time it provides that orders of 
a particular tribunal are to be enforced as a court 
order. Such a provision is non-criminal law; it is 
the common law which provides that breach of 
such an order may, in certain circumstances, be 
a criminal offence. [emphasis in original]
Section 127 was not unconstitutional. Parliament did 
not impermissibly delegate its federal criminal law 
power to provincial legislatures.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Guray, 2015 BCCA 183
After being  flagged down by a taxi 
driver in the early morning  hours, 
two police officers were told that the 
accused, a  passenger, would not 
leave the cab. Police attempted to get 
the accused’s attention and eventually assisted him 
out of the vehicle. He was arrested for being 
intoxicated in a  public place under BC’s Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act (LCLA). Police searched 
the accused’s pockets and found a  credit card with 
his name on it. They continued the search and also 
found approximately one-half gram of powder 
cocaine and ten and one-half grams of rock cocaine 
divided into 19 individually wrapped units. When 
arrested for possessing  the drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused said he was feeing  sick and 
his chest hurt. He was transported to the hospital for 
examination and, when discharged, taken to police 
cells where he was later released on a Promise to 
Appear when he was sober.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued that the police did 
not have sufficient grounds to arrest him 
under the LCLA for being  intoxicated in a 
public place. As well, he submitted that 
the taxi was not a “public place” as defined in the 
LCLA. In his view, the arrest was unlawful and the 
search incidental to his arrest went beyond a pat 
down. He contended that the evidence ought to 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).
The judge found that the surrounding  circumstances, 
plus the indicia noted by the officer, provided the 
necessary  reasonable and probable grounds, both 
subjectively and objectively, for an arrest under the 
LCLA. This included the location (a downtown area 
with many bars and public houses), the  time of day 
(shortly after the liquor establishments closed), and 
the officer’s experience. As for the search, the judge 
found it was properly conducted as an incident to 
arrest. An officer testified that he was searching  for 
evidence (such as alcohol), the accused’s safety 
(items he could use to harm himself), officer safety 
(weapons and tools to facilitate escape) and 
identification.  He also found the taxi was a “public 
place” since it had been rented out. The accused 
was convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s rulings arguing  he had 
erred in finding  the taxi to be a 
“public place” under the LCLA. He 
opined that he only entered a public place  when the 
police removed him from the taxi onto the sidewalk. 
As well, he contended that the police did not have 
the reasonable grounds necessary to arrest him since 
his symptoms of intoxication were equally consistent 
with illness. As for the search, he suggested it 
exceeded that which was permitted by law. After 
finding  the credit card identifying  the accused, the 
police were only looking  for alcohol, escape tools 
and weapons. A less intrusive pat-down search for 
these items, rather than a pocket search, would have 
sufficed. As a consequence, he argued the evidence 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
BY THE BOOK:
???? Liquor Control and Licensing Act
Public Place
s. 1 "public place" includes
(a) a place, building, passenger conveyance, 
boat or land to which the public resort or are 
permitted access, and
(b) a motor vehicle located on land to which the public resort 
or are permitted access;;
...
Drunkenness in Public Place
s. 41   (1) A person who is intoxicated must not be or remain 
in a public place.
(2) A peace officer may arrest, without a warrant, a person 
found intoxicated in a public place.
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“Public Place”
“Public place” is defined in the LCLA as including  “a 
motor vehicle  located on land to which the public 
resort or are permitted access.” Unlike the trial judge 
who found that the taxi was a public place because 
it had been rented out, the Court of Appeal found he 
had not “hired the taxi or become a ‘fare’ or, if he 
had, the fare had been terminated at the taxi driver’s 
direction.” Instead, the taxi was a “public place” 
because  it was a motor vehicle to which the “public 
resort or are permitted access”. In the Appeal Court’s 
view, it was unnecessary to determine whether the 
taxi would have remained a public place if the 
accused had hired it to take him to a destination.
Removal from the Taxi
Even though the police had not yet decided to arrest 
the accused, he was removed from the taxi onto the 
sidewalk, a public place. As for this action, the Court 
of Appeal found the police were justified in 
detaining  the accused and removing  him from the 
taxi. Justice Harris, speaking  for the Court of Appeal 
stated:
It appears to me that the police officers were 
entitled to require [the accused] to get out of the 
taxi, even if at that time they had not decided 
that they subjectively had reasonable grounds to 
conclude that he was intoxicated in a public 
place. [The officer] explained that she made him 
leave the taxi because he was refusing to do so 
at the driver’s request. She explained that the taxi 
was a commercial vehicle, that the owner or 
operator of the taxi had asked [the accused] to 
get out, he was not complying  with that 
instruction, and the taxi driver had requested 
assistance. [The accused’s] conduct falls within 
the definition of mischief contrary to ss. 430(c) 
and  (d) of the [Criminal Code] since he was 
obstructing  or interfering  with the lawful use or 
operation of the taxi by the taxi driver. [para. 18]
Thus, the accused had been in a public place 
throughout his interaction with the police, both 
while in the taxi and on the sidewalk. 
Arrest
Once the accused was out of the taxi the police 
completed their assessment of his condition. Section 
41 of the LCLA allows the police to arrest a person 
found intoxicated in a public place. “There is no 
dispute that a police officer may arrest a person if 
the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the 
person is intoxicated,” said Justice Harris. “A police 
officer must subjectively believe the person is 
intoxicated in a  public  place and that belief must be 
objectively reasonable. Reasonable grounds requires 
more than suspicion but something  less than proof 
on a balance of probabilities.”
As for whether there  were reasonable grounds in this 
case, the Appeal Court found the  officers were 
justified in making  the arrest. “The question is 
whether, in the  circumstances, the police officer’s 
subjective belief was objectively reasonable,” said 
Justice Harris. “I do not think that the police officer 
was required to rule out alternative explanations of 
[the accused’s] apparent condition before the police 
officer’s belief that he was intoxicated can be seen as 
being  a reasonably held belief.” The Court 
continued:
The trial judge identified a number of factors that 
grounded her conclusion that the police officer 
had reasonable grounds to conclude that [the 
accused] was intoxicated. Those grounds 
included the smell of alcohol, his bloodshot and 
glassy eyes, his unresponsiveness to questions, 
his balance problems, the time of day and the 
location where he was found. [The officer] also 
described other factors underlying  her subjective 
belief that he was intoxicated, each of which is 
c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g t h e o b j e c t ive 
reasonableness of her belief. For example, she 
“There is no dispute that a police officer may arrest a person if the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe the person is intoxicated. A police officer must subjectively believe the 
person is intoxicated in a public place and that belief must be objectively reasonable. 
Reasonable grounds requires more than suspicion but something less than proof on a 
balance of probabilities.”
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also referred to his unfocused eyes, his slow 
passive movements and his disheveled clothing. 
[The officer] formed the view that [the accused] 
was sufficiently intoxicated that he was 
incapable of looking after himself. On all of the 
evidence, that view strikes me as being 
objectively reasonable. [para. 23]
Search
The accused first submitted that the search of his 
pockets was unnecessarily intrusive because the 
police could have satisfied their objectives of 
searching  for more alcohol, tools to assist escape or 
weapons by means of a pat down search, which 
would have been unlikely to yield the drug 
evidence. Second, the accused’s semi‑comatose 
condition precluded him from posing  a concern for 
officer safety. Finally, the credit card identifying  the 
accused had been found at the beginning  of the 
search, before any drugs were found, thereby 
satisfying  any concerns about his identity. In his 
view, the circumstances of the search needed to 
comply with the  principles established for 
investigative detention in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52. 
In this case, however, the accused had been arrested 
and was not merely  detained for investigation. 
Therefore, the  power of search associated with arrest 
applied:
It is not in dispute that, assuming the arrest to be 
lawful, the police officers were entitled to search 
[the accused] incidental to the arrest. The search 
must be conducted for a legitimate purpose 
proximate in time and place to the arrest in 
order to be truly incidental to it. The search must 
be in furtherance of a valid police objective 
connected to the arrest itself. That objective 
inc ludes a s ea rch fo r ev idence . The 
reasonableness of the search is to be considered 
objectively.
The trial judge found that there were several 
objectively reasonable valid purposes justifying 
the search incidental to arrest. The most 
important of these included officer and public 
safety as well as [the accused’s] own safety. The 
Crown contends further that the evidentiary 
search for alcohol or other intoxicants, including 
drugs, was independently sufficient to justify the 
pocket search. I agree.
In my view, in all the circumstances, it was open 
to the judge to find that the search as conducted 
was objectively reasonable, and implicitly, that a 
simple pat-down search was therefore not all 
that could be justified in the circumstances. 
[paras. 25-27]
Since the arrest and search were  lawful, it was 
unnecessary to consider s. 24(2)  of the Charter. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Grounds For Arrest
As found by the trial judge, the officer articulated the 
following grounds for her belief that the accused was 
intoxicated by drugs or alcohol and not able to care for 
himself:
• His appearance, demeanor and behaviour:
• his eyes were wide open but glassy, red and 
unfocussed.
• his movements were slow and passive.
• his clothing was dishevelled.
• The faint smell of alcohol when she first dealt with him.
• He appeared unable to comprehend or unable to respond to 
verbal stimuli.
• The location – within the bar district of downtown Victoria.
• The time of day – approximately 3:30 a.m., after local bars 
have closed.
• The fact that it was very common for people to be 
intoxicated in the bar district of downtown at that time of 
day.
• The circumstances provided by the taxi driver – that he had 
just picked up the accused as a passenger and he would not 
or could not tell what his destination was and would not get 
out of the taxi.
• Her over 20 years as a member of the Victoria Police 
Department and nine years as an auxiliary member of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
• Her considerable experience, both professional and 
personal, dealing with people who are intoxicated by 
alcohol and/or drugs. 
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R. v. Ahmed-Kadir, 2015 BCCA 346
An apartment building  manager 
ca l l ed 9 -1 -1 a f t e r hea r ing  a 
disturbance in the suite occupied by 
the accused and a woman. He told 
the 9-1-1 dispatcher that he could 
hear two voices, a male and a female. Two police 
officers were dispatched to the call as a domestic 
assault in-progress. The dispatcher informed the 
officers that the caller reported hearing  a female 
voice crying  and screaming  “stop  hitting  me”, and 
the sounds of slapping. When police arrived some 
four minutes later, the building  manager directed the 
officers to the suite  where they could hear a  female 
screaming  inside. When the  officers knocked on the 
door and identified themselves as police, a female 
answered and stepped out into the hallway when 
asked to do so. The other officer entered the suite 
and asked for any persons inside to identify 
themselves. The accused came out of the bedroom 
and was arrested for assault. He was handcuffed, but 
not advised of his rights under s.  10(b)  of the 
Charter. He was placed on the sofa in the living 
room. The officer then cleared the suite after 
conducting a quick check for other persons. 
After speaking  with his partner, the arresting  officer 
removed the co-operative accused’s handcuffs. The 
police were trying  to determine  whether an assault 
had in fact occurred. Four other police officers 
attended at the suite. Two remained in the hallway 
and two went inside. One of these officers 
recognized the accused as someone affiliated with a 
gang  and “flagged as armed and dangerous”.  The 
accused was re-handcuffed behind his back and it 
was learned via  police radio that he had a firearms 
prohibition. The accused was asked if there were 
drugs or firearms in the suite, and told he could turn 
them over without charges being  laid.  He replied he 
was not aware of any such items. A police wagon 
driver then arrived and walked into the suite. She 
looked around, including  in the bathroom, the 
bedroom and the kitchen. In the kitchen she saw a 
“bong” and two clear bags on top  of the refrigerator. 
One bag  contained several balls of a black 
substance and the other contained a rock of a white 
substance. She believed these bags contained drugs 
packaged for trafficking.  She then opened a closet, 
which was to her back, but no one was in it. The 
arresting  officer, who was six feet tall, then checked 
the closet and looked into a  bag  on an upper shelf 
by standing  on his toes. In the bag  he observed a .
357 calibre Ruger revolver, which turned out to be 
loaded. He arrested the accused for possessing  the 
drugs (26.6 grams of cocaine) and the  handgun, and 
informed him of his right to counsel under s. 10(b). 
The female was also arrested when she said the 
drugs were hers. The accused’s fingerprint and palm 
print were  found on the handgun and on the bag  in 
which it was found. He was charged with three 
firearm offences as well as possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking. The female was also 
charged with possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The arresting  officer testified he believed 
he had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused based on the screaming  he had 
heard and unspecified information 
provided by the female. He said it was standard 
practice for the first officers on the scene to do “a 
quick clearance of the suite to make sure there’s no 
other parties we’re not aware of”, and leaving  it to 
other officers to do “a secondary safety search for 
other people.” The officer who opened the closet 
said she did so “just to make sure that the suite was 
clear of any people”, even though she did not speak 
to any of the officers already on scene nor had any 
information there  were more than two people in the 
suite. 
The accused argued that the warrantless searches 
that led to the seizure of the drugs and handgun 
were unreasonable and violated his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter.  In addition, he asserted that he was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 and that his right to 
counsel was infringed under s. 10(b).
The judge found breaches of both ss. 9 and 10(b). 
Although the accused’s initial arrest was lawful, his 
detention became arbitrary when he  was re-
handcuffed because that detention was unconnected 
with the domestic assault investigation. He found 
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the police “simply  wanted to keep  an ‘eye’ on [the 
accused] upon some vague suspicion that [he] may 
be up  to some improper activity.” As for the right to 
counsel, the judge found there was no reason for 
police to delay providing  the  accused with the 
informational component of s. 10(b) from the time of 
the initial arrest for assault until the time of the 
second arrest in relation to the drugs and the 
handgun, some 20 minutes later. 
The searches, however, were not unreasonable 
under s. 8. The judge found the  initial entry  by 
police into the suite was authorized because the 
officer was acting  in the course of a duty, and the 
entry  was a justifiable exercise of that duty.  The 
judge found that “the common law duty of police 
officers to fully explore 911 calls” that involved 
potential domestic violence was reasonable in the 
circumstances.  He also found the wagon driver’s 
clearing  search was reasonable  in the circumstances 
and seeing  the suspected drug  bong  and cocaine in 
the kitchen was simply incidental to that practice.  
Clearing  the hallway closet was also a  reasonable 
precaution as her observations of the suspected drug 
bong  and cocaine would clearly heighten officer 
safety concerns. The judge also held the clearing 
searches were  “justified” as incidental to the 
accused’s arrest. As for the  arresting  officer looking 
into the bag, the plain view doctrine was 
inapplicable because peering  up  and into the bag 
did not satisfy the requirement of inadvertence. 
However, this action was nonetheless reasonable 
given the officer’s “heightened safety concerns”. 
Despite the  ss. 9 and 10(b)  Charter breaches, the 
evidence was nevertheless admitted under s. 24(2). 
The breaches were unrelated to the discovery of the 
cocaine or the handgun and the officers did not act 
in bad faith. The accused was convicted of 
unlawfully possessing  a loaded prohibited firearm, 
unlawfully storing  it and possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. The female was acquitted of 
the drug charge. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions, in part, by asserting 
that the trial judge erred in finding 
that the warrantless searches did 
not breach s. 8 and in not excluding  the evidence 
under s. 24(2). He argued there were three searches 
of the suite:  
• The initial entry and clearing  search by the 
arresting officer;
• The clearing  search by the  wagon driver, 
including the closet; and 
• The closet and bag  search by the arresting 
officer.
He agreed the first entry  and clearing  search were 
lawful, but submitted the further searches were not. 
The Crown did not challenge the trial judge’s 
conclusions with respect to the ss. 9 and 10(b) 
breaches, but contended it would be artificial to split 
the police action into three searches. In the Crown’s 
view, the police engaged in a continuum of activity 
all of which was lawful under the “9-1-1 safety 
search doctrine.”
Warrantless Safety Searches
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the police 
can conduct a safety search of a residence. 
However, this power has its limits:
It is clear the police have the power, at common 
law, to conduct warrantless searches to ensure 
their own safety and the safety of others. It is 
also clear the exercise of that power within the 
limits of the common law will not infringe s. 8  of 
the Charter. However, there is no separate search 
doctrine applicable to 9-1-1 calls. Rather, when 
in the course of responding to a 9-1-1 call the 
police conduct a warrantless search, the nature 
of the call will be a factor in determining 
whether that power was validly exercised. [para. 
62]
Since the accused did not challenge the arresting 
officer’s entry into the suite nor his initial arrest, the 
wagon driver’s walk-through and looking  into the 
rooms was reasonable. She was entitled to assist the 
“It is clear the police have the power, at 
common law, to conduct warrantless 
searches to ensure their own safety and the 
safety of others.”
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arresting  officer and by being  lawfully in the  hallway 
she could look through open doors as she made her 
way to the living  room. As for the “clearing  search” 
of the bedroom, however, the  wagon driver’s belief 
that her actions were justified for reasons of officer 
safety was not objectively reasonable.  Matters 
appeared under control. Although the police had 
been dispatched to the suite in response to a 
domestic-dispute complaint involving  two parties, 
two officers were in the hallway outside the  suite 
dealing  with a woman and another officer was in the 
living  room dealing  with the accused. The Court of 
Appeal concluded these circumstances were 
insufficient to justify the wagon driver’s safety 
search:
This factual matrix does not support an 
objectively reasonable belief that a clearing 
search of the bedroom was necessary to ensure 
[the officer’s] safety or the safety of others.  
Indeed, the information upon which she acted 
does not support an objectively reasonable 
suspicion there was someone hiding  in the suite 
who posed a danger.
I particularly reject the argument advanced by 
the Crown that upon entering the suite [the 
officer] was entitled to look into every closet or 
space in which she believed someone could 
hide.  To accept that argument is to accept, for 
example, that the second wagon driver who 
arrived later was entitled to conduct another 
clearing search.  I would also point out that the 
alternative reason given by [the officer] for why 
she went into the bedroom—“to make sure we 
had the number of parties accounted for”—does 
not bear scrutiny. She responded to a domestic-
dispute complaint involving  two people.  Upon 
arrival, she found other officers dealing with a 
woman outside the suite and a man inside; the 
situation was under control.  She did not speak 
with any of those officers to inquire whether 
there were any persons unaccounted for or 
whether there were any outstanding  safety 
concerns.  Given the nature of the complaint 
there was no objective basis for her to even 
suspect someone else might be present. [paras. 
75-76]
As for opening  the closet, the wagon driver did not 
explain why she believed someone who posed a 
threat could be hiding  in it. She did not have an 
“objectively reasonable belief or suspicion that an 
examination of the inside of the closet was 
necessary to exclude a potential threat.” The 
bedroom and closet search conducted by the wagon 
driver were unreasonable.
Since opening  the closet door constituted an 
unreasonable  search, the examination of the 
contents of the closet was also unreasonable. And, 
even if the closet door could be opened for safety 
purposes, it would still be unreasonable to look into 
the bag. Its contents were not in plain view. The 
arresting  officer needed to stand on his toes to look 
in it. There was no reason provided by the officer 
why he was concerned about the bag’s contents and 
why it was necessary to look  inside it.  “While  he 
was interested in seeing  what was in the bag, there is 
nothing  in his evidence to connect that interest to 
safety concerns,” said Justice Frankel.  “He had no 
objective basis on which to believe or suspect the 
bag contained a weapon.”
s. 24(2) of the Charter
The cocaine was admitted as evidence. It was found 
in plain view by an officer lawfully  entitled to be in 
the suite and its discovery was unrelated to any of 
the other Charter breaches. The firearm, however, 
was excluded. “The importance of maintaining 
respect for Charter rights and ensuring  that the 
justice system remains above reproach outweighs 
the collective cost of his acquittal,” said Justice 
Frankel. “To admit the handgun in the face of the 
breaches that occurred here would send the message 
that when the charges are serious, individual rights 
count for little.” As a consequence, the drug 
conviction was upheld but the accused’s appeal 
concerning  the two firearm charges was allowed, 
those convictions were set aside  and acquittals were 
entered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[W]hen in the course of responding to a 
9-1-1 call the police conduct a warrantless 
search, the nature of the call will be a 
factor in determining whether that power 
was validly exercised.”
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BC’s new Missing Persons Act 
(MPA)  and Regulations (MPAR) 
recently became law. The  main 
goal of this new legislation is 
to improve police access to 
information that may hold 
clues to a missing  person's 
whereabouts. The law focuses 
on cases where a missing 
person hasn't been seen by, or in touch with, people 
who are normally involved in their lives. No 
evidence or proof of a criminal act is required. The 
legislation also focuses on vulnerable or at-risk 
persons whose safety and welfare are of concern 
because  of their age, physical or mental capabilities, 
or the circumstances surrounding  their absence. The 
legislation attempts to balance access to key 
information with privacy rights.
The MPA defines a “missing  person”, “person at risk” 
and “vulnerable missing person”: 
“missing  person”  means an individual whose 
whereabouts are  unknown despite reasonable efforts 
to locate the individual and
(a) who has not been in contact with those persons 
who would likely be in contact with the individual, 
or
(b) whose safety and welfare are feared for given
(i)   the individual's age,
(ii)     the individual's physical or mental capabilities, 
or
(iii)     the circumstances surrounding  the individual's 
absence.
“person at risk” means an individual assessed, in 
accordance with the regulations, to be at risk.
“vulnerable person” means an individual
(a) for whom a committee has been appointed under 
the Patients Property Act,
(b)  for whom a representation agreement under the 
Representation Agreement Act is in effect, or
(c) who is the subject of a support and assistance 
plan under section 53  or 56  of the Adult 
Guardianship Act.
In cases meeting  these thresholds, police will be 
able to apply for a court order. When applying  for a 
court order there is an application which must be 
completed by the police. The standard to be met for 
an order to be granted is “reasonable grounds to 
believe.”
Record Access Order
This order requires someone who has a missing 
person’s records to provide police with access to 
them. The legislation sets out the  scope of records a 
justice may order released, including  telephone 
calls, text messages, video footage, photographs, 
and school, health, employment, financial and other 
relevant data.
Search Order
This order allows entry into a private home or other 
location where police believe a minor, vulnerable 
person or person at risk may be located.
Third Party Record Access Order
This order provides access to the records of a person 
last seen with, or believed to be in the company of, 
a missing minor, vulnerable person or person at risk.
Emergency Demand for Records By Police
When there  is an emergency, such as a risk of 
serious bodily harm or death to a missing  person, or 
a concern that records could be destroyed, the MPA 
authorizes police to directly  demand access to 
records. 
When a police officer serves an Emergency Demand 
for Records on a person, the officer must, as soon as 
practicable, file a report in Form 2 with the police 
force’s officer in charge that sets out the 
circumstances in which the demand was made. 
Then, each year, the police force must prepare an 
annual report respecting  emergency demands for 
records made which must include:
• the number of missing  person investigations in 
which a demand was made;
• the total number of persons who were served 
with a demand; and
• any prescribed information.
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In the event a person fails to comply with an 
Emergency Demand, a police officer may apply for a 
court order requiring compliance. 
Applying for an Order
The Provincial Court of British Columbia has 
published a Practice Direction (CRIM 09) to set out 
the procedure for a police officer in making  an MPA 
application:
1. MPA applications are heard by Judicial Justices 
(JJs).
2. Applications in person may be made at the 
Justice Centre or in a court locations in which 
JJs are normally resident or regularly preside in 
traffic court. This does not include circuit courts 
where  there is no registry. JJs are considered 
available to hear applications in person during 
court sitting  hours when not presiding  in court, 
but not during  scheduled breaks, lunch 
adjournments, or outside of court sitting hours.
3. Applications by fax may be made to the  Justice 
Centre.
4. A police  officer is instructed to telephone the 
Justice Centre to give advance notice that an 
application will be made.
5. Applications may not be  referred to a judge 
without the approval of the applicable Regional 
Administrative Judge.
Disclosure of Information
The police may use information in a record accessed 
under the MPA only for the  purpose of locating  a 
missing  person or a  use consistent with that purpose. 
There are a number of limitations to the disclosure of 
this information. 
Retention of Information
Under the MPAR, the police must ensure that copies 
of records provided during  the missing  person 
investigation are disposed of within 90 days after the 
date the missing  person is located. However, copies 
of records may be retained if the  missing  person is 
found deceased, not located or for the purpose of a 
related criminal investigation.
Offences and Penalties
Persons who fail to comply with an order or 
Emergency Demand commit an offence. A person 
who fails to comply with the disclosure limitations 
also commits an offence. For individuals, the fine 
may be a maximum of $10,000 while a corporation 
can be fined a maximum of $25,000.
Other Provincial Missing Persons Acts
Alberta - Missing Persons Act
Nova Scotia - Missing Persons Act
Manitoba - The Missing Persons Act
Reference: Missing Person Act protects vulnerable persons.
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R. v. McIlmoyle, 2015 ONCA 505
The Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld a 
conviction of mischief for an accused who grabbed 
a parking  brake while  the vehicle was in motion. The 
accused, along  with his common-law wife, went to 
a party. After having  too much to drink and arguing 
with his wife, he decided to leave and walk home. 
Being  cold outside, the common-law wife called her 
daughter and persuaded her to drive  down the street, 
pick up the accused and drive him home. When the 
daughter located the  accused walking  on the side of 
the road, she stopped her car and asked him to get 
inside. He initially refused but did so. As they drove, 
the two began to argue and the accused told her to 
stop  the car so he could get out. She refused and 
continued to drive, avoiding  traffic lights and stop 
signs. About a minute  away from home, the accused 
reached over to the driver’s side of the vehicle  and 
pulled up on the parking  brake. The car spun out 
and came to rest at the side of the road. The accused 
got out, pushed the car back onto the road and 
continued his walk home. No one was injured and 
the car was not damaged.
On appeal, the  accused submitted that his 
conviction for mischief could not stand because the 
daughter was not in the lawful use of her motor 
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vehicle when the offence occurred. She was 
unlawfully confining  him in her car, refusing  to 
accede to his requests to leave the vehicle. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. “In our view, there 
was an adequate evidentiary basis upon which the 
trial judge could find that [the  daughter] was 
lawfully operating  her motor vehicle at the time the 
[accused] interfered with her operation of it by 
pulling  the parking  brake,” said the Court of Appeal. 
It continued:
The [accused] voluntarily entered the vehicle, 
well aware of [the daughter’s] intention to drive 
him home. Following her mother’s instructions, 
her purpose never changed. It is worth 
reminding  that the offence of unlawful 
confinement, said to be the vitiating element 
here, requires that the confinement be for a 
significant period of time.
It was open to the trial judge to conclude that 
Crown counsel had negated this offence, and 
thus established lawful operation, on the facts of 
this case. It is also arguable, though it was not 
advanced at trial, that [the daughter] was under 
a legal duty to continue her journey home 
because of the provisions of s. 217 of the 
Criminal Code and thus was not acting 
unlawfully in doing  so. [reference omitted, 
paras. 10-11]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Andrade, 2015 ONCA 499
Following  an altercation in a  park with a group  of 
young  people, the accused went to his apartment, 
armed himself with an object that resembled a silver 
handgun and returned to a parking  lot to confront 
the group. At the parking  lot he threatened to kill 
one of the young  men and struck him with the silver 
object. The accused went to trial on charges of 
possessing  an imitation weapon dangerous to the 
public peace  and using  an imitation weapon while 
committing  an indictable  offence. The trial judge 
found the accused’s actions went beyond mere 
possession of the imitation firearm and that he 
“used” it by pulling  it from his pants, striking  the 
young  man and intimidating  the other young  people. 
Since his “use” of the imitation firearm occurred 
while he  was committing  the indictable offence of 
possessing  it for a dangerous purpose, a conviction 
for using  it while committing  an indictable offence 
under s. 85(2) was entered. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the “use” 
conviction ruling  that a conviction for possessing  a 
weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace 
under s. 88(1)  of the Criminal Code (also known as 
weapons dangerous)  could not constitute the 
predicate  indictable offence necessary for a 
conviction of using  an imitation firearm while 
committing  an indictable offence under s. 85(2). The 
meaning  of the word “uses” found in s. 85(2) 
requires more than mere possession.  The “use” must 
facilitate the predicate  offence. Thus, the offence of 
using  an imitation (or real)  firearm during  the 
commission of an indictable offence requires a 
conviction for the specified indictable offence. 
On a charge of weapons dangerous, the Crown must 
only  establish that an accused possessed a weapon 
and that the purpose of that possession was one 
dangerous to the public  peace. In this case, the 
accused took possession of the  imitation weapon 
while in his apartment with the requisite  intent, even 
before he revealed it to the group  of young  people. 
However, his conduct in beating  the young  man 
with the imitation weapon and intimidating  others 
was not a “use” under s. 85(2).
I conclude that the trial judge erred in law in 
finding that the impugned conduct of the 
[accused] (i.e. the use of the imitation weapon to 
beat [the young man] and to intimidate others) 
constituted a use under s. 85. This use did not 
facilitate the commission of the predicate 
indictable offence, which was complete when 
the [accused] took possession of the imitation 
weapon with the requisite intent. The trial judge 
found that this occurred when the [accused] was 
still in his apartment, before he ever revealed the 
imitation firearm to the group of young people. 
[para. 37]
The accused’s conviction was under s. 85(2) was set 
aside. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. White, 2015 ONCA 508
The police suspected that the 
accused, who owned and occupied a 
condominium unit in a  10-unit 
building, was involved with dealing 
drugs. He had become the target of a 
police investigation after they suspected a drug 
trafficker was using  the accused’s condominium unit 
as a stash house. A detective  conducted three 
surreptitious entries into the common areas 
(stairways, hallways, and storage rooms) of the 
accused’s condominium building  without the 
knowledge of any of the  residents and without prior 
consent:
• First entry: The detective entered the building 
by following  a postal worker into the building 
through a door that was always locked. He then 
entered an unlocked storage room and 
observed the contents of a cage-like locker that 
corresponded to the number associated with 
the accused’s unit. He saw a charcoal or carbon 
filter, a blower fan and a garden hose, among 
other things, which he considered could be 
used in a grow-op. He did not touch anything 
in the locker room, take photographs or video, 
or install any devices. He then went upstairs 
where  he observed the accused’s unit. He was 
in the building for about 20 minutes. 
• Second entry: The detective  entered the 
building  through a locked stairwell door, which 
was insecure because it would not close 
properly. Once inside the building, he hid in a 
stairwell and saw a drug  trafficker leave the 
accused’s unit carrying  a box. This trafficker 
was later observed transferring  the box to a 
third person outside the building.
• Third entry: The detective stationed himself in 
the stairwell and observed the trafficker enter 
the accused’s unit. He then overheard a 
conversation inside the  unit and believed that it 
concerned a drug  deal. He also heard what he 
thought was the sound of packing  tape being 
removed from a roll. He saw the trafficker leave 
the unit with a  box in his possession and 
deposit it into a minivan. The minivan was 
pulled over by the police and the box  was 
found to contain 2,679.4 grams of marijuana 
and 166.6 grams of cocaine.
Using  the information gathered from these entries, 
the police obtained a  warrant to search the accused’s 
condo. The judge who issued the warrant was not 
informed that the detective had entered the locked 
building  without permission. When the warrant was 
executed, the police found 1.708 kgs. of cocaine, 
6.86  kgs. of marijuana and 5.1 grams of crack 
cocaine. The accused was arrested and found to 
possess 0.4 grams of cocaine and $400 in cash. He 
was charged with possessing  cocaine and marijuana 
for the purpose of trafficking, possessing  cocaine, 
and possessing property obtained by crime.
Ontario Superior Court
The accused brought an application 
alleging  a breach of his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter. In his view, the  three 
surreptitious entries and the subsequent 
search of his condo unit were unreasonable. The 
judge agreed, finding  that the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his condo and 
its common areas. The police infringed s. 8 by 
conducting  the warrantless searches without 
statutory authority. Nor did the police have a 
constitutionally unrestricted right to trespass upon 
the private property in order to conduct the 
searches. The  evidence obtained from the accused’s 
condo unit was excluded under s. 24(2)  and he was 
acquitted of possessing  cocaine and marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking  along  with possessing 
property obtained by crime. However, he was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine  based on other 
evidence obtained during the investigation.
“[T]he fact that a relatively large number of 
people may have access to a building’s 
common areas need not operate to eliminate 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. “
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Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the  accused’s 
acquittals arguing  that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that he had 
a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of the condo building. 
Thus, there was no s. 8  Charter breach. The Crown 
also submitted that the drugs should not have been 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2). 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
A reasonable expectation of privacy is determined 
having  regard to all of the relevant circumstances in 
a particular case, including  the  considerations 
enumerated in R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128:
• presence at the time of the search;
• possession or control of the property or place 
searched;
• ownership of the property or place;
• historical use of the property or item;
• the ability  to regulate access, including  the 
right to admit or exclude others from the place;
• the existence of a subjective  expectation of 
privacy; and
• the objective reasonableness of the expectation. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s 
“categorical proposition that ‘residents of multi-unit 
dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the  shared common areas of those 
buildings, and that police may conduct non-intrusive 
surveillance from these locations’.” Under the 
Crown’s view, the police would be granted virtually 
unfettered access to multi-unit dwellings. Instead, a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy is a context 
specific concept that is not amenable to categorical 
answers” and “a more nuanced, contextual 
approach is required.” Justice Huscroft, speaking  for 
a unanimous Appeal Court, stated:
If the police are entitled to climb through 
windows to gain entry to multi-unit residential 
buildings and, once inside, enter common areas 
such as storage rooms, hide in stairwells, and 
conduct surveillance operations for as long  as 
they want on those who live there – all without a 
warrant – on the basis that those who live in 
these buildings have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the common areas, then the 
concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
means little. [para. 43]
And further:
A resident may have possession or control of the 
common areas of a building to a greater or lesser 
extent. The size of a building may be a relevant 
consideration in determining  reasonable 
expectations of privacy, as even in the context of 
a locked building protected by a security system 
it is reasonable to assume that the number of 
people that may be present in the common areas 
of the building will vary in accordance with the 
size of the building  and its population. 
Ownership of the property may be of greater or 
lesser significance for the same reason. A 
resident of a large building with 200 units may 
have a lesser expectation of privacy than a 
resident of a small building with 2 apartments.
In this case, the [accused] owned a unit in a 
relatively small building that [the detective] 
testified had only 10 units over four floors. The 
building  was small enough that [the detective] 
“If the police are entitled to climb through windows to gain entry to multi-unit residential 
buildings and, once inside, enter common areas such as storage rooms, hide in stairwells, 
and conduct surveillance operations for as long as they want on those who live there – all 
without a warrant – on the basis that those who live in these buildings have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the common areas, then the concept of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy means little.”
s. 8 Charter
Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. 
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had to hide, otherwise his presence as a stranger 
in the building might have been noteworthy. It 
was small enough that, from the stairwell, [the 
detective] could overhear conversations taking 
place in the [accused’s] unit and identify specific 
sounds connected to activities going  on in the 
apartment (such as the unrolling  of packing 
tape). And, save for the malfunctioning north 
stairwell door, the building was always locked to 
non-residents.
Although the [accused] did not have absolute 
control over access to the building, it was 
reasonable for him to expect that the building’s 
security system would operate to exclude 
strangers, including the police, from entering the 
common areas of his building several times 
wi thout permiss ion or inv i ta t ion and 
investigating  at their leisure. It was reasonable 
for him to assume that although access to the 
building’s storage area was not regulated, it was 
not open to the general public. And it was 
reasonable for him to assume that people would 
not be hiding  in stairwells to observe the 
comings and goings and overhear the 
conversations and actions within his unit.
In any event, the fact that a relatively large 
number of people may have access to a 
building’s common areas need not operate to 
eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy. It 
is one thing to contemplate that neighbours and 
their guests, all of whom may be strangers to 
another resident, might be present in the 
common areas of a building, but another to say 
that a resident has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy as a result. An expectation of privacy 
may be attenuated in particular circumstances 
without being eliminated. [paras. 45-48]
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that 
the accused, in this case, did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the common areas of his 
condo building. Since he had a privacy expectation, 
the surreptitious entries into the building  were 
searches for Charter purposes. 
Were the Searches Reasonable?
A Charter  compliant search must be authorized by 
law, the authorizing  law must be reasonable and the 
search must be carried out in a reasonable manner. 
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. 
Since there  were no warrants authorizing  the three 
surreptitious searches, they were prima facie 
unreasonable. There were no exigent circumstances 
nor were the police responding  to a complaint. Nor 
could the searches be authorized under the implied 
invitation doctrine to enter common areas of the 
building  to conduct non-intrusive investigative steps. 
“Although it is clear that the  police, along  with 
members of the public, have an implied licence to 
enter a property and knock on the  door, this is for 
purposes of communicating  with the resident,” said 
Justice Huscroft. “In this case, the police did not use 
their implied licence to knock on the [accused’s] 
door. On the contrary, the police did everything 
possible  to conceal their presence in the building.” 
The Court of Appel added:
DISTINGUISHING CIRCUMSTANCES
The Ontario Court of Appeal distinguished White from 
two other cases in which no reasonable expectation was 
found when police entered apartment hallways. In those 
cases there was a single entry by police into the 
common hallways of apartment buildings in order to 
walk to a resident’s door in the course of investigating 
complaints. The police conduct was much less intrusive 
than in White and neither resident owned the unit.
In R. v. Laurin (1997), 98 O.A.C. 50, the police received 
an anonymous complaint and entered an apartment 
building through unlocked doors for the purpose of 
knocking on a resident’s door. Once inside the building, 
police smelled marihuana outside the accused’s 
apartment. The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded 
that the police did not infringe on the accused’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy by smelling 
marihuana in the hallway. The police were entitled to be 
in the hallway along with visitors, repair people and the 
landlord. 
In R. v. Thomsen, [2005] O.J. No 6303 (S.C.J.), aff’d 2007 
ONCA 878, the police were called by the property 
manager who reported a possible marihuana grow-op in  
a particular apartment. They entered the building  
through a locked door by following a tenant. Once 
inside, the police smelled marihuana in the hall outside 
the accused’s apartment and heard a fan or droning 
sound coming from the apartment. The judge concluded 
that the accused id not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. He was not present at the time, had no right 
of possession or control or ownership of the hallway , 
there was no history of the use of the hallway that 
would exclude others, such as the police, the accused 
had no right to regulate access to the hallway, there was 
no evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy and 
there was no objective reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
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Even assuming that the police entered the 
building  pursuant to an implied licence, the 
[accused] would have to establish that the 
searches were conducted reasonably. In my 
view, it would also fail at this step. [The 
detective]did not simply walk through the 
hallways of the building. He took advantage of 
defects in a security system in order to enter the 
building  and conduct surveillance. He hid near 
the [accused’s] unit in an attempt to eavesdrop 
or witness something. The building  was so small 
and the insulation was so poor that he was able 
to overhear conversations and activities in the 
[accused’s] unit from the stairwell. [para. 58]
Thus, the police were trespassers when they 
obtained evidence during  the three visits to the 
condominium prior to obtaining a search warrant. 
s. 24(2) of the Charter
The trial judge’s exclusion of the evidence was 
upheld. First, the Charter  breaches were serious and 
exacerbated by the detective's failure to inform the 
judge issuing  the warrant in the ITO about the 
circumstances in which he obtained the evidence. 
Second, the impact of the  breach on the accused’s 
Charter rights was also serious, even though a 
reasonable expectation of privacy may be attenuated 
in the  context of multi-unit buildings, where 
common areas including  hallways, stairwells, and 
storage rooms are shared by the residents:
        
In this case, the police overheard conversations 
and activities taking  place within a unit by 
hiding in a nearby stairwell. The home is entitled 
to the greatest degree of protection from 
unreasonable search, and in my view, the police 
conduct in this case had a serious impact on the 
[accused’s] privacy rights. [para. 66]
Finally, the trial judge’s conclusion was entitled to 
deference. He found the long-term impact of 
admitting  evidence obtained in the search of a 
dwelling  house with an improperly obtained warrant 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Nome, 2015 SKCA 73                    
 
The accused was being  held in a 
remand unit at a Saskatchewan 
Correctional Centre where he was 
allowed to wear street clothing. As a 
result of a disruption in the remand 
unit, he was transferred to the medical unit where he 
was required to wear institutional coveralls, no 
exceptions. He was repeatedly told to put on the 
coveralls but refused to comply, making  it clear that 
he was prepared to physically resist any attempt to 
force him to don the coveralls. He said there was no 
way he would be putting  on the coveralls and also 
said, “If you are going  to try to make me put them 
on there is going  to be a  fight.” He also indicated 
that more than two corrections officers would be 
needed to put the coveralls on him. More 
correctional officers came to assist. A correctional 
supervisor gave him a direct order to put on the 
coveralls and said that if he refused, corrections 
officers would put the coveralls on for him. The 
accused told a female corrections officer to leave the 
area as there was going  to be a physical altercation. 
After it was clear that the accused would not 
comply, corrections officers were told to put the 
coveralls on him.
When one of the correctional officers reached out 
with both hands to grab  the accused’s arm, the 
accused punched the officer in the mouth. The 
punch knocked the officer back and he tripped over 
the lip of a shower, fell back, and hit his head 
against the wall. During  a struggle  with the other 
corrections officers, the accused flailed his arms and 
legs and bit two officers. He ended up with a black 
eye, two missing  teeth and miscellaneous bruises. 
He was subsequently taken back to the medical unit 
where  he threatened a  nurse by stating, “I’m going  to 
smash your head in with a baseball bat.” He was 
charged with several offences. 
www.10-8.ca
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the corrections officers 
were entitled to use  force on the accused. 
They were “peace officers” under s. 2 and 
had the authority to use force under ss. 
25, 26, 27, 32, 35 and 37 of the Criminal Code. 
Saskatchewan’s Correctional Services Act gave 
corrections officers custodial authority over 
offenders who were subject to rules and regulations. 
As for the policy relating  to wearing  institutional 
coveralls, the judge found this was reasonable for 
safety and security purposes. Safety for the inmate 
because  it precluded the use  of clothing  or items 
associated with clothing  from being  used to harm 
oneself or others. Security  for inmates and staff 
because  it was unlikely that weapons could be 
hidden in the institutional coveralls without being 
noticed.
The accused had refused to comply with a 
reasonable order and the officer who reached out to 
grab him was in the lawful execution of his 
authority. When the accused punched the officer he 
escalated the situation such that the other 
correctional workers present were required and 
entitled to respond. The amount of force used was 
authorized, necessary and reasonable. The accused 
was convicted on two counts of common assault for 
biting  two officers, assault causing  bodily harm 
against the officer he punched and uttering  threats 
against the nurse. He was designated as a dangerous 
offender and received an indeterminate sentence of 
imprisonment.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused appea led h i s 
dangerous offender designation 
and his conviction for assault 
causing  bodily harm, which was 
the predicate offence for the purpose of the 
dangerous offender application. He argued that the 
corrections officers did not have the authority to use 
force against him and therefore  they were not in the 
lawful exercise of their duties when they attempted 
to use force against him. He contended that his 
refusal to don institutional coveralls was at most a 
Class C administrative offence under Saskatchewan’s 
Correctional Services, Administration, Discipline and 
Security Regulations, which would result only in a 
disciplinary hearing  and certainly not the use of 
force by corrections officers against him when 
enforcing  the rule. Furthermore, he submitted there 
were no powers of arrest nor was reasonable force 
authorized for Class C offences. In his view, if the 
officers were not acting  lawfully, self defence and 
consent to the altercation would need to be 
considered. 
Lawful Force?
Under s. 2 of the Criminal Code a “peace officer” 
includes “a member of the Correctional Service of 
Canada who is designated as a peace  officer 
pursuant to Part I of the Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act, and a warden, deputy  warden, 
instructor, keeper, jailer, guard and any other officer 
or permanent employee of a prison other than a 
penitentiary as defined in Part I of the Corrections 
and Conditional Release Act.” Under s. 25(1)  a 
peace officer “who is required or authorized by law 
to do anything  in the administration or enforcement 
of the law ... is, if he  acts on reasonable grounds, 
justified in doing  what he is required or authorized 
to do and in using  as much force as is necessary for 
that purpose.”
In delivering  the Court of Appeal’s decision, Justice 
Herauf first concluded that a guard-inmate 
relationship had been established in this case.  “[The 
BY THE BOOK:
Use of Force: s. 25 Criminal Code
s. 25(1)  Every one who is required or 
authorized by law to do anything in the 
administration or enforcement of the law
(a) as a private person,
(b) as a peace officer or public officer,
(c) in aid of a peace officer or public officer, or
(d) by virtue of his office,
is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what 
he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force 
as is necessary for that purpose.
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corrections officer] was a peace officer who had the 
power to provide a  correctional service,” he said. 
“Consequently, [he] had ‘custodial authority’ over 
[the accused]. Based upon his custodial authority, 
[the  corrections officer] was entitled to use 
reasonable force to enforce orders and subsequently 
avail himself of the protection of s. 25.” 
Second, in deciding  whether the force used was 
justified in the circumstances, “the Court should take 
into account the nature of the order made by the 
guard to the inmate, the nature of the inmate’s 
disobedience, the consequences (both actual and 
potential)  of the inmate’s disobedience, the inmate’s 
own circumstances, and the availability of 
alternatives to the use of force.” Here, the force  used 
was justified. The officer’s attempt to grab the 
accused’s arm was a reasonable use of force in the 
circumstances. It was a justified and appropriate 
response to the accused’s refusal to wear the 
institutional coveralls provided to him.
Justice Herauf rejected the accused’s submission that 
his refusal to comply with the directions of the 
corrections officers in this case could only result in a 
disciplinary hearing:
 
Even though the breach of a rule by an inmate 
will more likely than not result in a disciplinary 
hearing, this cannot possibly foreclose the use of 
force by corrections officers when situations 
arise that require urgent attention for safety or 
security reasons, such as in this case. It would 
make no sense in view of the urgent safety and 
security issues mentioned above, to initiate 
potential disciplinary proceedings with the 
inherent delays associated with such a hearing. 
To do so would basically make the rule relating 
to wearing  institutional coveralls in certain high 
risk units meaningless.
The correction officers were justified in using  force 
and the force used was reasonable in the 
circumstances. The  issues of self-defence and 
consent to fight did not need to be considered. 
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed and his dangerous offender designation 
was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Al-Amiri, 2015 NLCA 37 
After receiving  information from a 
reliable  informer, police suspected 
the accused of receiving  illegal drugs 
through the mail .  A package 
addressed to his residence, but with a 
fictitious name, was intercepted by postal officials. 
The package was opened and found to contain 
15,300 ecstasy pills.  Police removed all the pills 
except three. They obtained a general warrant under 
s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code  along  with a tracking 
warrant to effect a  controlled delivery of the 
package. The general warrant allowed a controlled 
delivery of the package and the securing  of whatever 
residence the package ultimately entered until a 
search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) could be obtained. The 
police believed a high risk entry by the Emergency 
Response Team (ERT) was needed because CPIC 
indicated the accused was “caution violent.” Police 
also had information that he was known to carry two 
handguns, had threatened to shoot anyone who 
went to the police and was known to keep  extra 
ammunition in his ball hat. He also had a teardrop 
tattoo on his face, which typically indicated in the 
criminal culture of having killed somebody.
Once an alarm sounded indicating  the package had 
been opened, the ERT entered the residence 
pursuant to the general warrant using  a “hard entry.” 
They called out “police, search warrant”, used a 
battering  ram to open the front door and threw in a 
stun grenade that emitted two bangs in quick 
succession. Three suspects, including  the accused, 
were arrested in various rooms of the home. They 
were ordered to lie on the floor at gun point, cross 
their feet and were handcuffed. ERT members were 
dressed in black uniforms with police shoulder 
flashes, black Kevlar ballistic vests with “POLICE” in 
white lettering  on the front and back, helmets, and 
balaclavas, and were armed with sidearms and other 
automatic weapons. Once the residence was 
secured, all three suspects were turned over to drug 
section members and the ERT left the residence 
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within 10 minutes of making  their entry. A search 
warrant was then obtained under s. 11 of the CDSA. 
Among  other things, two individually  wrapped 
grams of cocaine were found in the accused’s 
bedroom. Money, score sheets and scales were also 
found in the house.
 
Newfoundland Supreme Court
The police  testified that the stun grenade, 
a diversionary device, emitted about one 
million candle watts of light and 120 
decibels of sound in two bangs. The flash 
and the sound were designed to disorient anybody 
in proximity to it so they could not react. By sensory 
ove r load , t he though t p roces s o f t hose 
contemplating  hostile action against the police 
would be disrupted.  The effects would last only a 
few seconds.
The judge quashed the general warrant, finding  that 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure was breached 
because, in part, the police had not made full and 
frank disclosure of all relevant evidence by failing  to 
inform the authorizing  judge that they  intended to 
make a  hard entry. As well, the judge concluded that 
the manner in which the general warrant was 
executed was unreasonable. Police tactics were 
extreme. They used a forcible, hard entry by using  a 
battering  ram and a stun grenade, and were wearing 
riot gear while armed with automatic military style 
rifles. He also found the stun tactic  interfered with 
the bodily integrity of a person which was not 
permitted under s. 487.01(2). The judge also found 
the accused’s s. 7 Charter right to life, liberty and 
security of the person was violated by the manner of 
entry  and because the police failed to obtain a 
Feeney warrant to arrest him. The  evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2), including  the 4.5 kgs. of 
ecstasy pills, and the accused was acquitted.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the  accused’s 
acquittal arguing, among other 
things, that the trial judge erred in 
quashing  the general warrant. As 
well, the Crown contended that the manner in 
which the general warrant was executed was not 
unreasonable and that the police did not need an 
arrest warrant for the accused. 
Interference with Bodily Integrity
Under s. 487.01(2), the general warrant provision 
shall not be  construed so as to permit “interference 
with the bodily  integrity of any person”.  The 
accused’s submission that the hard entry by police 
involved such interference was without merit. “The 
general warrant did not purport to authorize 
interference with the bodily integrity of any person,” 
said Justice Barry speaking  for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal.  “It merely dealt with the delivery of the 
post office package and the securing  of the 
residence until such time as a search warrant could 
BY THE BOOK:
General Warrant: s. 487.01 Criminal Code
s. 487.01 (1) A provincial court judge, a judge 
of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a 
judge as defined in section 552 may issue a 
warrant in writing authorizing a peace officer 
to, subject to this section, use any device or 
investigative technique or procedure or do any thing 
described in the warrant that would, if not authorized, 
constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in respect of a 
person or a person’s property if
(a) the judge is satisfied by information on oath in writing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament has been or will 
be committed and that information concerning the offence 
will be obtained through the use of the technique, procedure 
or device or the doing of the thing;
(b) the judge is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the 
administration of justice to issue the warrant; and
(c) there is no other provision in this or any other Act of 
Parliament that would provide for a warrant, authorization 
or order permitting the technique, procedure or device to be 
used or the thing to be done.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as to permit 
interference with the bodily integrity of any person.
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be obtained pursuant to section 11 of the CDSA.” 
Furthermore, the onus was on the accused to 
establish interference with his bodily  integrity which 
he failed to do:
The alleged violation of [the accused’s] Charter 
rights by the hard entry may be disposed of 
simply on the grounds that he has presented no 
evidence to establish that in the present case he 
in fact suffered any discomfort at all because of 
the manner in which the police entered the 
residence. We have only the general evidence of 
a police witness that the diversionary device 
used, a stun grenade or “flash-bang”, was a two-
bang device which emitted a bright light and 
made two very loud noises. The witness testified 
that generally the effect of the device was to 
disorient anyone in range of the device by 
creating a sensory overload and that the noise 
and light only lasts for seconds.  [The accused] 
tendered no evidence which would demonstrate 
that he specifically suffered any actual 
interference with his bodily integrity. The general 
nature of the evidence regarding the effect of the 
diversionary device is not sufficient to prove a 
violation of his Charter rights. In any event, if we 
accept he was briefly disoriented, there is no 
evidence of any lasting  impact or interference 
with bodily function or health beyond the de 
minimus range. Therefore, the facts in this case 
do not support a finding that the search under 
the general warrant was carried out in an 
unreasonable manner and should be invalidated 
because of noncompliance with subsection 
487.01(2).
That is not to say that a hard entry can never 
amount to execution of a general warrant in an 
unreasonable manner.  It will depend upon the 
facts of each case. [paras. 51-52]
Knock and Announce
The Court of Appeal described the knock and 
announce rule as follows:
On the manner of execution of the general 
warrant, the law in Canada requires that, except 
in exigent circumstances, police officers must 
make an announcement and a formal demand to 
enter before entering  a dwelling  to execute a 
search warrant.  ...
The exigent circumstances recognized regarding 
this “knock and announce” rule include 
situations in which it is necessary to enter 
unannounced to prevent the loss or destruction 
of evidence, or for the safety of officers or the 
general public:  [references omitted, paras. 
46-47] 
In this case, the trial judge erred in discounting  or 
dismissing  the evidence regarding  the possible 
presence of weapons and the indications that the 
accused had an inclination toward violence.  The 
reliable  evidence that the  police had concerning  the 
possible  possession of knives and guns by the 
accused and another suspect, and the CPIC “Caution 
Violence” warning  provided sufficient evidence of 
exigent circumstances. This concern for officer safety 
justified a departure  from the knock and announce 
rule and use of the battering ram.
Need to Disclose Manner of Entry
The Court of Appeal found that “the  law does not 
require police to obtain prior authorization for a 
forcible entry even though they have the intent to 
“On the manner of execution of the 
general warrant, the law in Canada 
requires that, except in exigent 
circumstances, police officers must make 
an announcement and a formal demand 
to enter before entering a dwelling to 
execute a search warrant.”
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execute in this fashion before obtaining  a general 
warrant.” The trial judge erred in ruling  that “the 
failure to disclose this intent was a basis for finding 
the general warrant was not lawfully issued.” As 
noted in R. v. Cornell, 2010 SCC 31, judges are not 
to micromanage the police. 
Need for a Feeney Warrant  
There was no need for the police to obtain a Feeney 
warrant. “Feeney warrants under section 529 of the 
Criminal Code are  only required where the police 
do not have other lawful authority to enter premises 
where  an arrest is carried out,” said Justice Barry. “In 
this case, the general warrant gave  police the 
authority to enter any residence or other location 
where  the package might be delivered.  A Feeney 
warrant would be redundant in these circumstances 
since the issuing  of the general warrant had already 
resolved the question of possible interference with 
privacy rights in favour of enabling  police to 
preserve evidence of indictable offences.”  
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal found, even if the accused’s 
Charter rights were breached, the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2).
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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R. v. Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370
Mr. Guray was stopped in a rental car 
a f te r po l ice saw h im dr iv ing 
erratically  and exceeding  the speed 
limit. During  the course  of the traffic 
stop, the police developed a suspicion 
that Guray might have something  dangerous or 
illegal in his trunk and searched it, despite his 
objections. A backpack inside the trunk smelled of 
cocaine and held $38,000 in cash. Guray was 
arrested and the  vehicle was searched incidental to 
the arrest. A cell phone was located in a  cup holder 
between the front seats. When the centre button was 
pressed on it, the phone displayed a series of text 
messages that appeared to relate to a planned 
purchase of one kilogram of cocaine. Believing  that 
Guray was communicating  with a drug  supplier, an 
officer continued the text message conversation and 
arranged to meet the supplier in a parking lot.
When the police arrived at the parking  lot, they saw 
the accused inside a vehicle holding  a cellphone. 
He was arrested and his cellphone was seized. 
Police found a record of the text conversation on it. 
The accused’s vehicle was searched and a  one-
kilogram brick of cocaine was found in the trunk, 
together with a flap of methamphetamine and a 
plastic bag  containing  a small amount of crack 
cocaine. The police then obtained a warrant to 
search the accused’s home, which was also 
occupied by his parents. They were looking  for more 
cocaine based on the text messages. Several pieces 
of evidence were seized, including  a bag  containing 
280 grams of heroin, a  money counter and a 
vacuum sealed bag  containing  $57,550 in cash from 
the main floor. The accused was charged with two 
counts of possessing  a controlled substance for the 
purpose of trafficking  (cocaine and heroin) and one 
count of simple possession (methamphetamine). 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found that the accused, as the 
sender of the text message, had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
messages just like Guray did. First, the 
judge inferred that the  accused had a subjective 
expectation of privacy that his text messages with 
Guray were private. And second, he found that 
expectation to be objectively reasonable. He then 
went on to hold that the police did not have the right 
to search Guray’s vehicle or his backpack and his 
arrest, based on evidence from these searches, was 
unlawful. The search and seizure of Guray’s 
cellphone and reading  the text messages was 
therefore unreasonable. Absent the  text messages 
from Guray’s cellphone, the police lacked the 
necessary grounds to arrest the accused and, 
therefore, the search of his vehicle was also 
unlawful. As for the search warrant, once the judge 
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excised the illegally obtained evidence from the ITO 
he concluded the warrant was invalid. Thus, the 
search of the accused’s residence was unreasonable 
under s. 8 of the Charter and the evidence was 
excluded. The accused was acquitted of the three 
drug charges. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
acquittals and sought a new 
trial, submitting  that the trial 
judge erred in finding  the 
accused’s rights were violated by the search of 
Guray’s cellphone. In the Crown’s view, the accused, 
as sender of the text message, did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Once he sent 
it, he relinquished all control over the record of it 
and how it could be further disseminated when it 
reached the recipient’s cellphone. Therefore, his 
Charter rights were not breached when the text 
messages he sent to Guray  were read by police on 
Guray’s cellphone. Although Guray’s rights may have 
been breached because the police lacked authority 
for the search of Guray’s cellphone, the Crown 
argued that the accused lacked standing  to raise a 
Charter argument.
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Justice Groberman, speaking  for a 
two member majority, found the 
accused maintained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the text 
messages. In his view, control, by 
itself, was not determinative of the 
i s sue . The accused had a 
subjective expectation that his 
text message would be kept 
private. “Although the defence 
called no evidence to establish that expectation, the 
circumstances leave little room for any other 
conclusion,” said Justice Groberman. “It would 
strain credulity to suggest that a reasonable person 
would have engaged in such a conversation if they 
thought that the messages would be shared with 
others.”
As for whether the accused’s belief that his 
conversation was private was objectively reasonable, 
the majority found it was. Objective reasonableness 
is not one of probability – whether the text messages 
would likely remain private. Rather, a normative 
assessment of reasonableness is required – “whether, 
in keeping  with societal and legal norms in Canada, 
the sender of a text message should reasonably 
expect that the texts will remain private on the 
recipient’s device”:
While there will be situations in which the 
content of the text message or the situation 
negative these ordinary expectations, it seems to 
me that the social norm is to expect that text 
messages remain private communications 
between the sender and recipient.
It is true that once a text message has been 
delivered to the recipient, it will, as the Crown 
argues, cease to be under the exclusive control 
of the sender. With respect to the recipient’s 
copy of the message, it is the recipient who will 
be in a position to keep it private or to 
disseminate it further. The sender, therefore, 
cannot have absolute confidence that the 
message will remain private. Much will depend 
on the nature of the message, the relationship 
between the sender and recipient, the character 
of the recipient, and the circumstances in which 
the message is received.
These factors, however, do not necessarily 
impinge on the question of whether, for s. 8 
purposes, the sender has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the message. A person’s 
right to privacy does not depend on there being 
no reasonable possibility of an intrusion on that 
right. For example, a person who shares a home 
with others will, to a greater or lesser degree, 
surrender some privacy. In an intimate setting, 
there may, in fact, be a limited sphere of 
absolute privacy. Even in such a setting, 
however, the person retains a reasonable 
expectation that his or her private affairs will be 
free from state intrusion. A person’s home 
remains his or her castle even if that castle is 
shared with family members or other residents.
“[I]t seems to me that the social norm is to expect that text messages remain private 
communications between the sender and recipient.”
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The Crown’s position on this appeal – effectively 
that a sender never has a reasonable expectation 
that a message will remain private after delivered 
to a recipient’s device – does not, in my view, 
comport with social or legal norms. A sender 
will ordinarily have a reasonable expectation 
that a text message will remain private in the 
hands of its recipient. [paras. 65-68]
And, even though the text conversation in this case 
was for a criminal purpose, that fact alone did not 
affect the reasonable expectation of privacy:
Apart from criminality, there is nothing 
remarkable about the content or circumstances 
of the text conversation at issue in the case 
before us. Nothing in the situation suggests that 
the ordinary expectation that a text message 
exchange will remain private was displaced. 
[The accused] had a reasonable expectation that 
the text messages would remain private on Mr. 
Guray’s cellphone. To be sure, he assumed the 
risk that Mr. Guray could disseminate the 
messages further. He was entitled, however, to 
expect that the police would not search the 
messages without authorization. When they did 
so, they violated his reasonable expectation of 
privacy. [paras. 70-71]
The accused’s s. 8 rights were breached by the 
unlawful seizure of text messages from Mr. Guray’s 
cellphone. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and 
the acquittals upheld.
Editor’s note:  The search and seizure in this case 
was conducted unlawfully by police. The majority 
distinguished this case from cases where a  search 
was legally conducted, noting  that “a person cannot 
have a reasonable expectation that messages on 
another’s cellphone will remain private in the face of 
a lawful search of the device.” So, had Guray’s arrest 
been lawful and the search of the cellphone 
reasonable, then the accused would likely  have 
been unsuccessful with his arguments. 
No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Justice Goepel, in dissent, reached a 
different conclusion. In his opinion, the 
sender of a text message does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
message after it reaches its intended recipient. He 
would not infer a subjective  expectation of privacy 
for the accused nor did he find privacy objectively 
reasonable on the totality of the circumstances:
[T]he privacy interest in a text message 
in tent ional ly sent to o ther people to 
communicate information terminates at the time 
the message reaches the intended recipient(s).
 
In my view, where a person voluntarily 
communicates information to a third party using 
a method of communication that creates a 
contemporaneous record and that message 
reaches its intended recipient, the autonomy 
interest underlying our s. 8  understanding of 
privacy is fully realized. This approach derives 
from the conceptual framework underpinning 
informational privacy in text messages in our s. 8 
jurisprudence, i.e., the “wider notion of control 
over, access to and use of information, that is, 
‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions 
to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is 
communicated to others’”. This view is 
predicated on an “assumption that all 
information about a person is in a fundamental 
way his own, for him to communicate or retain 
… as he sees fit”.
 
Where a person sends a text message, they have 
already made a preliminary decision on “when, 
how and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others”. The question is 
whether they have a continued claim as against 
the recipient on how he or she may use (and 
further communicate) the information to others. 
In the alternative, the question is whether a 
residual privacy right exists for information that 
is intentionally communicated to a third party 
and reaches its intended recipient. 
The expectation that one person would keep a 
communication wholly secret from all others 
becomes more or less reasonable depending  on 
the relationship with that person. It would, in my 
view, be wholly unreasonable to find that it 
“[A] person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation that messages on another’s 
cellphone will remain private in the face of 
a lawful search of the device.”
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would be expected that a complete stranger 
would keep any and all information, no matter 
how personal or revealing, secret solely because 
it was sent to him or her by way of text message. 
This would amount to a conclusion that the 
medium itself creates an expectation of privacy. 
Such a finding would not be consistent with the 
s. 8  authorities, which recognize that the 
assessment must focus on the particular case in 
the totality of its particular circumstances. 
A person who − without any guarantee of 
confidentiality or indication from the recipient 
that the message will be kept confidential − 
communicates information has made an 
autonomous choice (i.e., determined for himself 
or herself) who, how and to what extent to 
communicate information to the fullest extent 
possible. Any further claim against a recipient is 
a claim that the sender can then determine who, 
how and to what extent the recipient will 
communicate information to further third parties, 
which interferes with the recipient’s notional 
sphere of personal autonomy. Without a pre-
existing obligation or arrangement that 
information will be kept confidential, it is wholly 
unreasonable to expect the information will be 
private. [refernces omitted, paras. 114-118]
And further: 
The immense storage capacity of computers and 
cellphones and their ability to generate 
information about the intimate details about a 
user’s interests, habits, and identity that made it 
reasonable − even in cases where access or 
control was reduced or eliminated − to 
nevertheless reasonably expect privacy, do not 
arise in this case when one focuses solely on text 
messages that are voluntarily communicated and 
that have reached its intended recipient. [para. 
133]
Since  the accused did not have  a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the text messages stored on 
Guray’s phone, the accused’s Charter rights were not 
violated by the search of Guray’s cell phone. 
Therefore, the accused could not challenge the 
admissibility of the text messages. Justice Goepel 
would have allowed the Crown’s appeal, set aside 
the acquittals and order a new trial.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Webster, 2015 BCCA 286
 
After arresting  a woman for dial-a-
doping, the police searched her 
cellular telephone. In it, police found 
two telephone numbers for a person 
called “Dru Boss Man”, believed to 
be her drug  supplier. Subscriber information 
revealed the names of two men and associated 
addresses. As a result of further investigation, the 
police obtained a production order under s. 487.012 
of the Criminal Code  requiring  TELUS provide copies 
of text messages, including  those sent and received 
from the woman’s telephone number. Confidential 
source information and other follow-up  information 
subsequently directed the police to a condominium 
unit where the lead investigator also happened to 
live. The lead investigator obtained a copy of a 
“Rental Information Report” containing  the 
accused’s address and telephone number from the 
property manager of the building.  The telephone 
number was the same as the number for “Dru Boss 
Man” contained in the arrested woman’s cellular 
telephone.  It was also the  same number for the 
name “Drew” as provided by the two informants. 
The investigator also reviewed the text messages 
obtained under the production order. He saw they 
were related to drug  trafficking  between the accused 
and the previously arrested woman.  
Surveillance was set up  at the accused’s condo 
building  after police received information that he 
would be receiving  a drug  delivery. After many hours 
of surveillance, police saw a white pickup truck pull 
up  in front of the building. The accused came out, 
went to the driver’s side of the vehicle and was given 
a plastic bag  that contained white and brown 
bags.  He went back into the building. The police 
followed and were let into the building  by another 
resident. They arrested the accused in the elevator. 
The bags contained a white powdery substance 
believed to be cocaine and a hard yellowish 
substance believed to be crack cocaine.  The total 
weight of the drugs was approximately  one 
kilogram.  Police then went to the accused’s 
apartment where they believed a woman (his 
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girlfriend) was present.  They removed her and 
secured the premises pending  a search warrant 
application. The police obtained a warrant to search 
the accused’s unit and found about 12 ounces of 
cocaine, three scales, a collection of “score sheets,” 
an envelope containing  $4500 cash, and 
identification, a  tenancy  agreement and other 
documents in the accused’s name.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
The accused argued that a number of his 
Charter rights were breached. These 
violations, according  to the accused, 
included (1)  the police needing  a Part 6 
authorization to “intercept” his text messages (a 
production order was not sufficient), (2)  the police 
violated his privacy interests by entering  the 
building, which was protected by a key or access 
code, (3)  the police needed a  Feeney warrant to 
arrest him in the elevator of his building, and (4)  the 
police were  not justified in making  the warrantless 
entry  into his condo after his arrest but prior to 
obtaining a search warrant.
 
As for the text messages, they were admissible. The 
judge ruled that they had not been intercepted such 
that a Part 6 authorization was required. Instead, a 
production order was sufficient to obtain the texts. 
They were stored records of communication – they 
had already been delivered to the recipient. The 
judge also concluded that the accused did not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the  common 
areas of his condo building. The officer, who also 
lived there, testified that “non-occupants of the 
building  are routinely in the hallway of the 
complex.” The common areas of the building  “were 
fairly  accessible to the public  without a key or other 
means of entry or the permissions of owners.” There 
was no expectation of privacy in the hallways of the 
building  and a  warrant was not required for the 
police “to enter the  common areas of this complex 
and make observations.” As for the necessity of a 
Feeney warrant (ss. 529‑529.5 of the Criminal Code) 
to enter the building  to arrest the accused in the 
elevator, the judge found the common areas of the 
complex were not part of the accused’s dwelling 
area where  a  resident would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
As to the need of an arrest warrant, it was 
unnecessary. The officer had the requisite  reasonable 
grounds to effect the arrest under the  warrantless 
arrest provisions of the Criminal Code  because  he 
believed the accused had committed an indictable 
offence. The entry into the accused’s condo unit after 
arrest but prior to obtaining  the search warrant was 
also justified. The police had exigent circumstances. 
They believed the accused’s girlfriend was in the 
apartment and they needed to enter quickly to 
prevent the destruction of evidence.  They entered 
the condo, removed the accused’s girlfriend, and 
waited for the search warrant to be delivered to them 
before the search was commenced. The judge also 
rejected the assertion that the police themselves 
created the exigent circumstances by failing  to get a 
warrant earlier than they did. There  was no need for 
them to obtain a  warrant earlier than they did and 
there  was no evidence that they were trying  to 
create exigent circumstances upon which to act. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused appea led h i s 
conviction arguing  the trial judge 
erred, in part, by finding  that the 
text messages had been lawfully 
obtained by the police. He also suggested that the 
police breached his s.8 Charter rights when they 
entered his condo building  to effect his warrantless 
arrest and that there  were no exigent circumstances 
that justified the police entry  into his residence 
without a warrant. 
Historical Text Messages
The trial judge did not err in holding  that a 
production order under s. 487.012 could be used to 
obtain historical text messages from a telephone 
company. There  was no need for the police to use 
Part VI of the  Criminal Code to obtain the texts. The 
police were not obtaining  the prospective daily 
production of ongoing  text messages from the 
telecommunications service provider such that it 
amounted to an “intercept.” The police were not 
interjecting  themselves in the communication 
process by seizing  text messages after they were  sent 
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but before they were received. Rather, the text 
messages were historic, having  already been sent, 
received and recorded. The police were seeking 
recorded information and that is what the 
production order sought to obtain. The Court of 
Appeal found the trial judge did not err in upholding 
the use of the production order to obtain the text 
messages in this case. 
 
Common Areas
Justice Chiasson, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
also agreed with the trial judge that the accused 
failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of the condominium 
complex. Thus, his rights were not violated when the 
police entered those areas of the building  without a 
warrant. Although the building  doors required a key 
or pass to open, this was not determinative of 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. 
“In my view, the issue is not how secure the building 
was, but how exclusive occupation of the common 
areas was,” said Justice Chiasson.“The evidence was 
that members of the public generally, and 
tradespeople in particular, regularly were in the 
common areas.” He continued:
I conclude that there was ample evidence to 
support the judge’s finding that “common areas 
of this particular residential complex were fairly 
accessible to the public….”  In my view, she was 
correct in concluding  that the [accused] did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
common areas of the building and that a warrant 
was not required for the police to enter. [para. 
77]
 Warrantless Arrest
 
Even though he was arrested in the elevator, the 
accused contended that the police required a Feeney 
warrant to arrest him in the building. And, regardless 
of the location of the arrest, he  suggested that the 
police should have first obtained a warrant because 
they had sufficient information to apply  for one. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the  ruling  of 
the trial judge. Sections 529 to 529.5 of the  Criminal 
Code  set out the procedure for obtaining  a warrant 
to enter a “dwelling  house” to arrest an occupant. 
“Dwelling  house” is defined in the Criminal Code as 
“the whole or any  part of a building  … that is kept or 
occup ied a s a pe rmanen t o r t empora ry 
residence…”.   The area in which the accused was 
arrested did not necessitate  the police to first obtain 
a Feeney warrant. The common areas of the 
condominium complex were not part of the 
accused’s dwelling  “because  they are generally 
accessible by the public and not the dwelling  area 
where  the resident has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.” Thus, the police were not required to 
obtain a Feeney warrant when effecting  the arrest in 
the common area of a condominium complex.
 
As for the police obtaining  a warrant because they 
had the grounds to apply for one, this submission 
[T]he issue is not how secure the building 
was, but how exclusive occupation of the 
common areas was. The evidence was that 
members of the public generally, and 
tradespeople in particular, regularly were 
in the common areas.”
“[T]he [accused] did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
common areas of the building.”
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was also rejected. “The evidence  was that having 
witnessed what they considered to be a drug 
transaction, the police concluded that the [accused] 
should be arrested while in possession of the drugs,” 
said Justice Chiasson. “No consideration was given 
to letting  him return to his apartment while the 
police waited to obtain a warrant.”
 
Exigent Circumstances
 
Although s. 529.3  of the Criminal Code and s. 11(7) 
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 
authorizes the police to enter premises without a 
warrant if “exigent circumstances” make it 
impractical to obtain one, the accused argued that 
the police could not rely on “exigent circumstances” 
for entry if they created them. Again, the Court of 
Appeal agreed with the trial judge that there was no 
evidence that the police were trying  to create 
exigent circumstances:
 
[T]he judge reviewed the circumstances faced 
by the police.  She rejected the contention that 
they created the need for immediate entry by 
not getting  a warrant to arrest the [accused].  
They believed the [accused] was a drug dealer.  
It was reasonable that evidence confirming  this 
would be in his apartment. They understood that 
the [accused’s] girlfriend was in the apartment 
and would be expecting him to be gone for only 
a short time.  They were concerned she might 
dispose of evidence.
 
The police had been preparing  materials to 
support an application for a warrant for some 
time. They were faced with an active, unfolding 
crime and circumstances which they believed 
posed a risk that evidence in the [accused’s] 
apartment might be destroyed. They did not in 
fact search the premises without a warrant. They 
secured it until the warrant was obtained. [paras. 
89-90]
 
There were exigent circumstances justifying  a 
warrantless entry into the accused's condominium 
unit.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Caza, 2015 BCCA 374
A police  detective was investigating 
a peer-to-peer network used for 
sharing  child pornography files. 
Using  the username and password of 
another man who had been arrested, 
the detective posed as the contact. On the account, 
the detective  discovered a number of messages 
referencing  child pornography from the username 
Paper123boy. The following  day messages arrived 
from Paper123boy offering  to share files which 
contained child pornography. The Internet Protocol 
(IP)  address for Paper123boy was captured and it 
was determined that Shaw was the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP). A “law enforcement request” was sent 
to Shaw and the name and address of the IP  user 
was provided. This IP  address holder, Mr. Feltham, 
had briefly resided with the accused but cancelled 
his Shaw account when he moved out. The accused, 
who continued to reside at the address, then 
reinstated the account by  fraudulently posing  as 
Feltham, the original IP  holder. The police prepared 
an information to obtain a search warrant (ITO)  for 
the accused’s residence and he was arrested. A 
search revealed a 500 gigabyte hard drive 
containing  thousands of images and videos of child 
pornography. The accused was charged with several 
offences related to possessing  and distributing  child 
pornography and luring  a person under the age of 
16.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused sought to have the seized 
hard drive excluded as evidence arguing, 
in part, that the ITO was based on 
unlawfully obtained information. He 
submitted that the police required a warrant to 
obtain the IP  subscriber information from Shaw. The 
judge, however, found that that the accused had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber 
information associated with the IP  address. Thus, the 
request for the subscriber information was not a 
warrantless search and therefore not unreasonable. 
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Furthermore, even if there was a s. 8  Charter breach, 
the judge would have admitted the  evidence under 
s. 24(2).  The  accused was convicted of possessing 
child pornography, transmitting  or making  available 
or distributing  child pornography, and breach of his 
s. 810.1 recognizance. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
After the trial judge’s ruling, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Spencer, 2014 SCC 43  found that 
an accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his ISP  information and a 
police request for this information amounted to a 
search under s. 8  of the Charter. The accused 
appealed his convictions arguing  the trial judge 
erred in holding  that he  did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the ISP information. 
Justice Stromberg-Stein, writing  the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, agreed that the accused did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this 
case. Although it could be inferred that he had a 
subjective  expectation of privacy, it was not 
objectively reasonable. Unlike  the case  in Spencer, 
the accused did not have permission to use 
Feltham’s Shaw account. 
In my view Spencer is distinguishable. Although 
[the accused] had a direct interest in the subject 
matter of the search, including an informational 
privacy interest of anonymity in the subscriber 
information linking  him to his particular, 
monitored Internet activity, and a territorial 
privacy interest resulting from his use of his 
home computer, and he may have had a 
subjective expectation of privacy, his subjective 
expectation was not objectively reasonable. 
[The accused] did not have the permission of 
Mr.  Feltham to use his Shaw account and, in 
fact, fraudulently hijacked his Internet account.  
Lack of permission in the circumstances of this 
case is sufficient to render any subjective 
expectation of privacy [the accused] may have 
had objectively unreasonable. [para. 32]
The accused had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the subscriber information associated with 
the IP  address which led to a  search of his Internet 
activities in his own home. Since there was no 
Charter breach, a s. 24(2) analysis was unnecessary. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569 
The accused crashed his vehicle into 
two trees.  Both he and his front-seat 
passenger were  seriously injured and 
transported to hospital. Hospital staff 
drew the accused’s blood for 
medical purposes. The police, believing  he was 
intoxicated, subsequently obtained a  search warrant 
authorizing  the seizure of his blood and hospital 
records relating  to this medical treatment after the 
crash. The warrant also required the police to bring 
the seized items before the justice who issued the 
warrant or another justice “to be dealt with 
according  to law.” A toxicologist analyzed the blood 
and determined that the accused’s BAC at the time 
of the crash was over 80mg% and that his level of 
intoxication would have impaired a person’s ability 
to drive. He was then charged with impaired driving 
causing  bodily harm and over 80mg% causing 
bodily harm some two months after the crash. A 
report to a justice, however, was not filed for about 
another seven weeks after the charges were sworn 
(15 weeks after the seizure).. 
Ontario Court of Justice 
The investigating  officer testified he 
thought s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code, 
which requires a report to a justice be 
made “as soon as is practicable,” was 
only  operative when charges were laid. He said he 
did not know that the provision required him to 
report to a justice “as soon as is practicable” after 
the seizure.
“Lack of permission in the circumstances 
of this case is sufficient to render any 
subjective expectation of privacy [the 
accused] may have had objectively 
unreasonable.”
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The judge found that the accused had “a high 
expectation of privacy in the items seized, both of 
which contain a high level of personal and private 
information.” He then went on to conclude that “the 
police failure to report to a  justice as soon as 
practicable rendered the otherwise valid search 
unlawful and unreasonable, contrary to s. 8 of the 
Charter.” He then excluded the evidence under s. 24
(2) and the accused was acquitted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge's decision arguing  that the 
officer’s failure to file a timely 
report to a justice under s. 489.1
(1), in relation to lawfully seized items, was not a s.8 
Charter breach. The Court of Appeal rejected this 
submission, agreeing  with the trial judge that the 
police breached the accused’s rights. 
Reporting to a Justice
The Appeal Court first noted that there were  a 
number of conflicting  cases concerning  whether or 
not a failure to comply with s. 489.1(1)  amounted to 
a breach of the Charter. Some cases support the 
view such a failure renders the continued detention 
of a seized item unreasonable while others support 
the view that failure to comply does not breach s. 8. 
Associate Chief Justice Hoy, authoring  the 
unanimous judgment, recognized that s. 489.1(1) 
“applies to both warrantless common law seizures 
and seizures pursuant to a  warrant.” He then went 
on to find that a s. 8 breach occurred when the 
officer failed to comply with the requirements of s. 
489.1(1)  by not making  a report to a justice as soon 
as practicable. By  failing  to do so, the continued 
dentition of the seized item was unreasonable:
If a peace officer fails to file a report under s. 
489.1(1), the property seized is not subject to 
judicial supervision during  the investigation 
under s. 490. The real importance of s. 489.1(1) 
is its link to s. 490. [para. 16]
And further:
[I]t is clear that an individual retains a residual, 
post-taking reasonable expectation of privacy in 
items lawfully seized and that Charter protection 
continues while the state detains items it has 
taken. Sections 489.1(1) and 490 govern the 
continued detention by the state of the items 
seized and, I conclude, the requirement in s. 
489.1(1) to report to a justice as soon as 
practicable plays a role in protecting  privacy 
interests. The Constable’s  post-taking violation 
of s. 489.1(1) by failing to report to a justice for 
more than three months after seizure of the 
blood and hospital records compromised 
judicial oversight of state-detained property in 
which the [accused] had a residual privacy 
interest. It therefore rendered the continued 
detention unreasonable and breached s. 8. The 
fact that a person may have a diminished 
reasonable expectation of privacy after a lawful, 
initial police seizure and that in a particular case 
there may have been virtually no impact on that 
expectation will be important factors in the 
BY THE BOOK:
Report by Peace Officer: s. 489.1 Criminal Code
s. 489.1 (1) Subject to this or any other Act of 
Parliament, where a peace officer has seized 
anything under a warrant issued under this Act 
or under section 487.11 or 489 or otherwise 
in the execution of duties under this or any 
other Act of Parliament, the peace officer shall, as soon as 
is practicable,
(a) where the peace officer is satisfied,
(i) that there is no dispute as to who is lawfully entitled to 
possession of the thing seized, and
(ii) that the continued detention of the thing seized is not 
required for the purposes of any investigation or a 
preliminary inquiry, trial or other proceeding,
return the thing seized, ...; or
(b) where the peace officer is not satisfied as described in 
subparagraphs (a)(i) and (ii),
(i) bring the thing seized before the justice referred to in 
paragraph (a), or
(ii) report to the justice that he has  seized the thing and is 
detaining it or causing it to be detained
to be dealt with by the justice in accordance with subsection 
490(1).
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analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter. However, 
they will not render continued detention after a 
clear  violation of the requirement in s. 489.1(1) 
to report to a justice as soon as practicable 
reasonable.
It is established law that in order to be 
reasonable, a seizure must be authorized by law. 
If seized property is detained without complying 
with s. 489.1(1), then its continued detention is 
not authorized by law. [references omitted, 
paras. 45-46]
And further:
[T]he requirement in s. 489.1(1) to report to a 
justice as soon as practicable plays a role in 
protecting an individual’s residual, post-taking 
reasonable expectation of privacy. I therefore 
conclude that the Constable’s clear failure to 
comply with that obligation breached s. 8.
One indicator of the privacy-related role of s. 
489.1(1) is the fact that the form of the warrant 
authorizing the initial seizure required the peace 
officer to comply with s. 489.1(1) (“[T]his is to 
authorize and require you… to bring [the seized 
things] before me or some other justice to be 
dealt with according to law”).
A second indicator is the substance of the 
provision itself. Section 489.1(1) requires a 
peace officer who wishes to detain a thing 
seized to bring  the thing  before a justice or 
report to a justice that he or she has seized the 
thing. It engages judicial oversight of state-held 
property in which privacy interests subsist. It 
also ensures that a record is made of what was 
actually seized. Such a record may be critical if 
a person seeks to assert that the initial seizure 
was overly broad or that the state does not need 
the item seized for its investigation.        
A third  indicator of the role of s. 489.1(1) is the 
nature of the rights s. 490 provides to 
individuals whose property has been taken. Two  
aspects of that section are particularly important.
First, s. 490(2) requires the state to give notice to 
the person from whom the detained thing  was 
seized if the state wishes to obtain an extension 
beyond the initial three-month detention period. 
Notice gives the affected person the opportunity 
to argue that the nature of the investigation does 
not warrant further detention of the item seized. 
If the state does not need the item for the 
purpose envisaged when it seized it, and the 
state’s continued detention of the property is not 
otherwise legally justified,[6] the individual’s 
privacy interest should prevail. Moreover, notice 
under s. 490(2) may be the only way an affected 
individual learns exactly which items the state 
has taken. ....
[...]
A second important aspect of s. 490 is that it 
provides the lawful owner of the item seized, a 
person lawfully entitled to possession of the item 
seized, or the person from whom the item was 
seized the right to apply for return of the 
item ... . Return of the seized   items reduces or 
eliminates the risk that the state will violate the 
person’s residual privacy interest. ...
The recording of the items seized, the right to 
notice and the right to apply for return of things 
seized confer important protections on people 
whose items the state holds in detention. 
Compliance with s. 489.1(1) is the gateway to 
all of these protections. The [officer] failed to 
report to a justice for over three months after the 
blood and hospital records were seized. 
Effective judicial oversight of property in which 
the [accused] maintained a residual privacy 
interest was compromised. I conclude therefore 
that the Constable’s clear failure to comply with 
the requirement in s. 489.1(1) that he report to a 
justice as soon as practicable breached s. 8  of 
the Charter. I leave for another day whether any 
other breach of s. 489.1(1) or any breach of s. 
490 – even if so minor or technical as to have 
no real impact on the judicial oversight 
contemplated by the sections – would breach s. 
8  of the Charter. [references omitted, paras. 
48-55]
Admissibility
Despite the Charter breach, the Court of Appeal 
overturned the trial judge’ exclusion of the 
evidence. He failed to consider a number of relevant 
factors in his s. 24(2)  analysis. The evidence was 
admissible, the  Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accused’s acquittal was set aside  and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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